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ABSTRACT 
Government agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so 
few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis and its resulting banking failures. This Article analyzes why—contrary to 
a longstanding historical trend—personal liability may be on the decline, and 
whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis 
confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and 
social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a 
“wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, 
ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to try to innovate and 
create value in the increasingly competitive and complex global economy. This 
Article examines how law should control that risk-taking and internalize its 
costs without impeding broader economic progress, focusing on two key 
elements of that inquiry: the extent to which corporate risk-taking should be 
regarded as excessive, and the extent to which personal liability should be 
used to control that excessive risk-taking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been significant frustration with the Obama administration,1 as 
well as with foreign governments,2 for not seeking criminal or even civil 
liability against individuals responsible for the excessive risk-taking that was a 
principal cause of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis (the financial crisis) 
and its associated banking failures.3 Despite criticism—and against the 
historical trend during much of the twentieth century4—few financial 
executives have been prosecuted.5 Rather, the primary focus of prosecutors has 
been the financial firms themselves.6 
 
 1 See, e.g., Interview by Frontline with Ted Kaufman, Del. Senator (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/ted-kaufman-wall-street-prosecutions-
never-made-a-priority (expressing frustration and disappointment with his own political party that no 
prosecutions had gone forward).  
 2 See, e.g., Sarah White, In Post-Lehman Clean-Up, Top Banker Prosecutions Stumble, 
REUTERS (Sep. 13, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-lehman-fiveyear-crime-
idUSBRE98C0GR20130913 (observing the frustration in the United Kingdom and in Spain stemming from 
the paucity of attempts to prosecute those in the “highest echelons of banking,” and also observing that 
“[f]rustrations over the slow progress of legal probes in Spain is even leading some activist groups to consider 
lobbying the United Nations to list economic crimes as a crime against humanity, even though they admit it is 
unlikely to happen”). 
 3 Excessive risk-taking is widely regarded to have been a principal cause of the financial crisis. See, e.g., 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix 
(2011) (identifying excessive risk-taking as a primary cause of the financial crisis); Jacob J. Lew, Opinion, 
Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky Practices in the Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-practices-in-the-past/2015/01/09/cf25b 
5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html (repeatedly attributing the financial crisis to “excessive risks 
taken by financial” firms); The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-
article (identifying excessive risk-taking as one of three causes of the financial crisis, the other causes being 
irresponsible lending and regulators being “asleep at the wheel”); see also infra notes 22–23 and 
accompanying text (observing that most of the actions leading to the financial crisis represented excessive 
corporate risk-taking). Although this Article uses the hyphenated term “risk-taking,” some sources may 
equivalently refer to “risktaking” or “risk taking.”  
 4 In response to the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis, for example, special U.S. government task forces 
referred 1,100 cases to prosecutors, which resulted in more than 800 bank officials being jailed. Gretchen 
Morgenson & Louise Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, 
at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html; see also David Zaring, Litigating the 
Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1411–13 (2014) (arguing that the lack of individual liability following 
the financial crisis has been quite surprising, especially when considering the last housing crisis where over 
one thousand financial executives were convicted of crimes and the dotcom collapse of 1999–2000 where a 
similar number were held accountable). Zaring further observes that “holding no executives responsible during 
this collapse in the housing market, while imprisoning hundreds of them during earlier downturns, smacks of 
arbitrariness, or, even worse, a different standard for Wall Street and Main Street financiers.” Id. at 1413. 
 5 See, e.g., Colin Maher, Note, Crisis Not Averted: Lack of Criminal Prosecutions Leave Limited 
Consequences for Those Responsible for the Financial Crisis, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
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Numerous firms have been fined for activities related to the financial crisis, 
including the origination, packaging, and sale of mortgage-backed securities. 
These fines are certainly substantial7—aggregating in the tens of billions of 
dollars,8 which is comparable if not larger than the aggregate yearly income of 
the largest financial firms.9 But from the perspective of multiple-year earnings, 
 
459, 462 (2013). Maher also discusses the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), which was 
enacted in response to the financial crisis, in order to broaden federal fraud statutes to include mortgage 
lending businesses and brokers, wherever found, and to increase federal investigative and prosecutorial 
resources for mortgage fraud detection and prosecution. Id. at 464. No criminal prosecutions resulted. Maher 
notes that there was a questionable increase in resources, the government was still required to prove specific 
intent, and although future frauds might be prosecuted using FERA, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution would bar charges against those engaged in problematic actions before the enactment of FERA. 
Id. at 465. 
 6 In August 2012, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that it had no basis to 
prosecute Goldman Sachs employees in regard to allegations in the Levin–Coburn Report that Goldman Sachs 
made large profits from marketing collateralized debt obligations (CDO) securities backed by subprime 
mortgage loans as safe investments to clients, while betting against the same securities. See Dominique 
Debucquoy-Dodley, No ‘Viable Basis’ to Prosecute Goldman, Justice Department Says, CNN (Aug. 10, 2012, 
7:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/business/goldman-justice-department/; infra note 17. Goldman 
Sachs nonetheless paid $550 million in settlement of civil claims with regard to the activity in question. Phil 
Mattingly & Robert Schmidt, U.S. Agencies Probing Goldman Findings After Senate Referral, BLOOMBERG 
(May 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-03/levin-report-accusing-
goldman-of-deception-referred-to-u-s-justice-sec.  
 7 Richard McGregor & Aaron Stanley, Banks Pay Out $100bn in U.S. Fines, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2014, 
6:42 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/802ae15c-9b50-11e3-946b-00144feab7de.html (quoting Tony Fratto of 
Hamilton Place Strategies as stating that the fines were “very substantial”). 
 8 See Jason M. Breslow & Evan Wexler, How JP Morgan’s $13 Billion Settlement Stacks Up, 
FRONTLINE: THE UNTOUCHABLES (Nov. 19, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/how-jpmorgans-13-billion-settlement-stacks-up. This Article 
reports settlements made with financial institutions for abuses involving the type of mortgage-related activities 
that led to the financial crisis, including a $25 billion settlement with Bank of America Chase, JP Morgan 
Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Ally Financial; a $13 billion settlement with JP Morgan Chase; a  
$550 million settlement with Goldman Sachs, and a $417 million settlement with JP Morgan and Credit 
Suisse. Id. In July 2014, Citigroup agreed to a $7 billion settlement with the Department of Justice, arising 
from Citigroup repeatedly ignoring warnings that a significant portion of the mortgages it packaged and sold to 
investors in 2006 and 2007 had underwriting defects. See Jason M. Breslow, Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion to 
End Mortgage Deal Probe, FRONTLINE: THE UNTOUCHABLES (July 14, 2014, 1:03 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/citigroup-to-pay-7-
billion-to-end-mortgage-deal-probe; see also Andrew Grossman & Christina Rexrode, Citi to Pay $7 Billion to 
Settle Loan Probe, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2014, at A1. In August 2014, a settlement of $16 billion was 
announced with Bank of America, the largest in U.S. corporate history. Christina Rexrode & Andrew 
Grossman, BofA Accord Ends a Long Legal Drama, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2014, at C1. The U.S. Department 
of Justice is reportedly engaged in settlement negotiations with a number of banks, and there is some evidence 
that fines are getting stiffer. Id. 
 9 McGregor & Stanley, supra note 7 (“A little more than $52bn of the total was paid out in 2013 
alone. . . . JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs [] 
had combined earnings of $76bn in 2013 . . . .”).  
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some experts view the fines as simply the “cost of doing business.”10 Professor 
Coffee similarly claims that “the SEC is settling cheaply with entities and 
ignoring individuals—a policy of parking tickets for securities fraud.”11 
Whether or not firms are settling cheaply, the real concern is that, being 
managed by individuals, firms themselves are second-best targets of 
deterrence.12 Targeting managers in their personal capacity is thus widely 
viewed as a greater,13 if not also a more optimal,14 deterrent than firm-level 
liability. Better deterrence is critical because insufficient deterrence could sow 
the seeds—as may already be occurring15—for future systemic meltdowns.16 
The consequences could be horrific. The financial crisis itself was 
 
 10 Id. (quoting Professor Anat Admati of Stanford University).  
 11 John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law Sch., Presentation at the 
New York City Bar 1st Annual Securities Regulation and Enforcement Institute Program: Securities 
Enforcement: What Has Happened? Why Are Folks Upset? What Can Be Done? (Dec. 11, 2012), http:// 
slideplayer.com/slide/2541449/.  
 12 See Claire A. Hill & Richard W. Painter, Why S.E.C. Settlements Should Hold Senior Executives 
Liable, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/why-s-e-c-
settlements-should-hold-senior-executives-liable/ (arguing that when penalties are assessed only against an 
entity, the individuals responsible have little incentive to change their behavior and thus, in order to change 
that incentive, individuals should also be personally liable); see also Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s 
Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability,  
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1187–89 (2010) (arguing that high-level bankers should be held personally 
liable). 
 13 See, e.g., Mary Jo White, U.S. SEC Chair, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 
Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202#.VE7m_iJ4pK4 (observing two reasons for 
this greater deterrence: that economic actions taken against individuals not only require them to pay out of 
their only pockets but also impose reputational costs—a form of shaming—causing the individuals to lose 
social standing). The reputational costs might also include, of course, the inability to continue working in the 
financial sector. Id. 
 14 Some argue that adding the threat of personal liability to the threat of firm-level liability should be the 
optimal deterrent. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and 
Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 246–50 (1993) 
(arguing that personal liability is needed in addition to firm-level liability to reach the optimal level of 
deterring corporate moral hazard); Cedric Argenton, Eric van Damme & Sigrid Suetens, Optimal Deterrence 
of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance 26 (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper No. 
2014-053, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540155 (same). 
 15 See, e.g., Tracy Alloway, US Banks Warn on ‘Excessive’ Risk-Taking, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014, 3:53 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fdc293a8-1d6e-11e4-8b03-00144feabdc0.html (reporting that a member 
of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, a group of banks and investors selected to help advise on 
markets and the economy, “warned the U.S. Treasury Department that low volatility in many financial markets 
is creating a feedback loop that exacerbates ‘excessive risk-taking’ by investors”); Victoria McGrane, Obama 
Meets Top U.S. Financial Regulators at White House, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 6:11 PM), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/obama-meets-top-u-s-financial-regulators-at-white-house-1412618345 (observing executive 
branch frustration that “Wall Street is still taking on too much risk in the pursuit of self-enrichment”). 
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an economic assault that cost millions of Americans their jobs and 
homes, while wiping out investors, good businesses, and 
markets . . . . High risk lending [and other activities] contaminated 
the U.S. financial system with toxic mortgages and undermined 
public trust in U.S. markets.17 
Moreover, in addition to increasing deterrence, targeting managers in their 
personal capacity can help to increase accountability and fairness: 
[W]hen it comes to financial fraud, the [U.S. Justice] department 
recognizes the inherent value of bringing enforcement actions against 
individuals, as opposed to simply the companies that employ them. 
We believe that doing so is both important—and appropriate—for 
several reasons: First, it enhances accountability . . . [because] 
corporate misconduct must necessarily be committed by flesh-and-
blood human beings. . . .  
Second, it promotes fairness—because, when misconduct is the 
work of a known bad actor, or a handful of known bad actors, it’s not 
right for punishment to be borne exclusively by the company, its 
employees, and its innocent shareholders.  
And finally, it has a powerful deterrent effect.18 
This Article examines the extent to which managers, in their personal 
capacity, should be subjected to liability (personal liability) in order to better 
 
 16 Cf. Press Release, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Senate Investigations 
Subcommittee Releases Levin-Coburn Report On the Financial Crisis (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.hsgac. 
senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-
report-on-the-financial-crisis (statement by Senator Tom Coburn attributing blame for the financial crisis to 
“Wall Street bankers who let greed run wild”). Given that many of the activities that led to the financial crisis 
occurred in 2006 and 2007, the window of opportunity to pursue personal liability cases stemming from the 
crisis may have passed. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at New York University 
School of Law (Sep. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-
fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law; cf. Ted Kaufman, Opinion, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big to Jail, 
FORBES (July 29, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/29/why-doj-deemed-
bank-execs-too-big-to-jail/ (quoting Lanny Breuer, head of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, who observed that “[t]he strongest deterrent against corporate crime is the prospect of prison time for 
individual employees”); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4 (arguing that the individual prosecution is a better deterrent 
and more technically and morally sound than prosecuting a company); Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent, 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Address at the Exchequer Club (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ 
speeches/sp140319.pdf (“[R]eal deterrence, in my opinion, means a focus not just on corporate accountability, 
but on individual accountability.”). 
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deter excessive corporate risk-taking.19 Individuals potentially can be subjected 
to criminal liability and to non-criminal liability. Criminal personal liability 
ordinarily involves incarceration and sometimes involves monetary penalties. 
Non-criminal (or civil) personal liability ordinarily involves only monetary 
penalties. 
Because this Article is concerned with deterring excessive corporate 
risk-taking, it focuses on personal liability in the form of monetary penalties. 
Excessive corporate risk-taking is not—and arguably should not be20—
criminal per se, or even criminally fraudulent.21 Although most of the actions 
leading to the financial crisis represented excessive corporate risk-taking, that 
risk-taking largely resulted from poor decisions, bad judgment, and greed—
and not criminal intent.22 The head of the Criminal Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice has likewise recognized the inapplicability of criminal 
law to deter excessive corporate risk-taking: 
I’ve literally had lawyers and U.S. attorneys studying every single 
one of these [financial crisis failures] . . . . with the same level of 
zealousness that we have in all those other areas[] they’ve looked at 
it. But ultimately they have said in many of these cases that we 
cannot bring a criminal case. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . I am personally offended by much of what I have seen. I think 
there was a level of greed, a level of excessive risk taking in this 
situation that I find abominable and I find very upsetting. But that is 
not what makes a criminal case. . . .  
 
 19 In theory, this Article’s analysis can apply to any type of firm that engages in business. In practice, the 
analysis is intended primarily to apply to systemically important firms—that is, firms whose failure would be 
likely to have systemic consequences. 
 20 Cf. infra note 22 and accompanying text (observing that the risk-taking leading to the financial crisis 
resulted not from criminal intent but from poor decisions, bad judgment, and greed). 
 21 Cf. Jean Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702040832045770807923569614 (reporting that some legal experts have 
explained that “most controversial behavior [such as risk-taking] likely was a product of poor judgment, not 
criminal wrongdoing”); Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013, 2:13 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/making-mismanagement-a-crime/ (observing the Department of 
Justice’s explanation for the lack of criminal prosecutions of corporate executives for risk-taking: “the 
difficulty prosecutors face in proving an individual’s specific intent to commit a crime”).  
 22 Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 256–57 (2014). There are, of course, 
other reasons advanced for the financial crisis. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why 
Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1283–84 (2013) (maintaining that the 
financial crisis resulted from Wall Street’s alleged co-option of politicians and regulators). 
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. . . . 
. . . [O]ur criminal justice system is created so that in that kind of 
a situation, we cannot prevail.23 
Unqualified references in this Article to personal liability will hereinafter 
mean liability for monetary penalties only. This focus on civil liability says 
nothing about whether future financial crises could result from fraud or other 
criminal actions—as opposed to excessive risk-taking. The law may well 
already be sufficient, however, to deter many of those criminal actions.24 There 
is no indication, for example, of a decline in personal criminal prosecutions of 
financial fraud.25 
This Article begins by analyzing why, post-financial crisis, prosecution has 
focused so heavily on firm-level liability and not personal liability. To that 
end, Part I examines changes in financial firms and markets, changes in law’s 
intersection with finance, and changes in prosecutorial behavior that may be 
impeding the imposition of personal liability for excessive corporate 
 
 23 Interview by Frontline with Lanny Breuer, Head of Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 30, 
2012) (emphasis added), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/ 
untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished/. Breuer suggests, as does this Article, 
that civil liability is the more appropriate remedy: “[I]f you can establish that you . . . were open about your 
greed, that you were open about [and disclosed] the fact that your representations may not be precise [and the 
other side accepts that or doesn’t care], do I think we . . . . should sue you for every penny you’re worth? I 
think we should sue you for every penny you’re worth.” Id. 
 24 Cf. Rakoff, supra note 18 (arguing that criminal liability should be imposed if the Great Recession 
arose from “fraudulent practices, of dubious mortgages portrayed as sound risks and packaged into ever more 
esoteric financial instruments, the fundamental weaknesses of which were intentionally obscured”). 
 25 Cf. Holder, supra note 18 (“Between 2009 and 2013, the Justice Department charged more white-
collar defendants than during any previous five-year period going back to at least 1994.”). There is a related 
inquiry that is beyond the scope of this Article: whether certain types of financial fraud cases are becoming 
difficult to criminally prosecute because their complexities undermine the ability of prosecutors to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. For more information on the failed securities-fraud criminal case against two Bear 
Stearns hedge fund managers that may exemplify this type of case, see infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
Attorney General Holder observes that 
when it comes to more complex transactions that involve more sophisticated traders—as opposed 
to run-of-the-mill “liar loan” cases or out-and-out Ponzi schemes—a criminal prosecution of an 
individual can be difficult, more complicated, to mount. This is true for any number of reasons—
from possible advice-of-counsel defenses; to the adequacy or inadequacy of written disclosures; 
to the difficulty to establish materiality and intent. And in some instances, it is simply not 
possible to establish knowledge of a particular scheme on the part of a high-ranking executive 
who is far removed from a firm’s day-to-day operations.  
This has been a source of frustration for the public for a long time.  
Holder, supra note 18.  
SCHWARCZ GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/14/2016 2:36 PM 
540 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:533 
risk-taking. In that context, it also examines what “excessive” corporate 
risk-taking should mean in a world of increasing systemic risk. 
Part II next analyzes whether more should be done to impose personal 
liability for excessive corporate risk-taking. It begins by examining whether 
firm-level liability is sufficient to control and internalize the costs of that 
risk-taking. Thereafter, it examines whether firm-level liability is efficient to 
control and internalize those costs. 
Finally, Part III explores what more could be done to impose personal 
liability in light of the aforesaid changes, without undermining broader 
economic progress. In that context, it proposes, among other things, a public 
governance duty under which a systemically important firm’s managers should 
be required to run the firm as agents not only for the investors but also for the 
public, and also should be personally liable if they breach that duty—just as 
they are now personally liable if they breach their governance duty to 
investors. Consistent with the view that optimal regulation should include 
flexibility in choosing different forms of public control,26 Part III also 
considers personal liability imposed indirectly by law, such as narrowing the 
limited liability protection of certain shareholding managers to reduce moral 
hazard. 
I. CHANGES IMPEDING THE IMPOSITION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY 
This Part examines changes that may be impeding the imposition of 
personal liability for excessive corporate risk-taking, in order to understand 
why the post-financial crisis prosecution has focused so heavily on firm-level 
liability. The examination focuses first on changes in financial firms and 
markets, then on changes in law’s intersection with finance, and finally on 
changes in prosecutorial behavior. 
 
 26 See infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. This Article does not examine all forms of optimal 
regulation that could limit excessive risk-taking or its systemic consequences; its scope is limited to regulation 
that imposes personal liability to deter excessive risk-taking. Thus, the Article does not consider, for example, 
whether to break up systemically important firms. I am, however, separately comparing regulation that 
imposes personal liability to deter excessive risk-taking with other forms of regulation. See infra note 142. 
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A. Changes in Firms and Markets 
1. Systemic Risk Is Complicating What Constitutes “Excessive” 
Risk-Taking 
The financial crisis has raised concern over excessive corporate 
risk-taking.27 The increasingly competitive and complex global economy, 
however, requires firms to take greater risks to innovate and create economic 
value.28 Unsophisticated attempts to curtail risk-taking could inadvertently 
destroy that value.29 It therefore is critical to be able to distinguish appropriate 
from excessive risk-taking. 
Until the financial crisis, it seemed relatively easy to make that distinction 
by taking into account the consequences of corporate risk-taking. Most 
observers assumed that a firm’s failure would primarily, if not exclusively, 
harm its investors.30 Accordingly, corporate risk-taking was assessed—and 
therefore “excessive” risk-taking was implicitly defined—by its potential 
impact on those investors, typically focusing on the tension between 
risk-seeking shareholders and more risk-averse creditors.31 In most 
circumstances,32 the interests of shareholders would trump those of creditors, 
 
 27 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xvii–xix; Hurt, supra note 22, at 254–57 (observing 
that most of the actions leading to the financial crisis represented excessive corporate risk-taking); Lew, supra 
note 3. 
 28 Cf. Gabriel Jiménez, Jose A. Lopez & Jesús Saurina, How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-
Taking? 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-23, 2007), http://www.frbsf.org/ 
economic-research/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-23bk.pdf (arguing that increasing competition 
among banks increases the need to engage in risk-taking: “Competition [in banking] should . . . encourage 
[banks] to pursue riskier policies in an attempt to maintain [their] former profits”).  
 29 See Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/economy/the-cost-of-the-financial-crisis-is-still-being-tallied.html 
(observing that regulations that require financial institutions to increase capital cushions to buffer against risks 
and potential losses have been criticized for cutting into global economic output and reducing jobs). 
 30 Hurt, supra note 22, at 290 (“If excessive risk-taking harms anyone, it is the shareholder.”); cf. Robert 
T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 110 
(2010) (observing and expanding that traditional view by listing four different ways in which financial risks 
can be excessive, one them being risks in excess of the shareholders’ risk tolerance).  
 31 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 647, 679 (1996). Shareholders tend to be risk-seeking because they typically benefit fully from an 
increase in a firm’s value but only partially are harmed by a decrease. Creditors tend to be more risk-averse 
because they typically do not benefit from an increase in a firm’s value and are harmed by a fall in the firm’s 
value that causes insolvency. Id. at 674.  
 32 The exception is a firm’s insolvency, and arguably also its “contingent insolvency,” when the firm’s 
creditors effectively become senior residual equity claimants. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 671–72 
(explaining this and defining contingent insolvency).  
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who nonetheless could try to bargain to protect their (risk-averse) interests 
through contractual covenants in their loan agreements.33 The responsibilities 
of a firm’s managers, who run the firm as agents for the investors, to engage in 
corporate risk-taking were therefore primarily driven by shareholder interests. 
Moreover, the enforcement of those responsibilities was delegated to privately 
enforced rights,34 through such means as shareholder derivative suits.35 
Systemic risk—in this context, the risk that a financial firm’s failure will 
impact other financial firms or markets, resulting in a domino-type collapse 
that ultimately harms the real economy36—is complicating corporate 
risk-taking and intensifying the consequences of corporate failure. By creating 
ambiguity about what amount of risk-taking is “excessive,” systemic risk 
confuses even corporate law experts about when to penalize risk-taking that 
causes a firm to fail.37 There are two sources of confusion, one semantic, the 
other substantive. The semantic source of confusion stems from emotionally 
laden terminology—the tendency of the public and the media to characterize 
risk-taking corporate managers as wrongdoers if their firm fails.38 To mitigate 
this confusion, this Article will limit the term “wrong” to an action that 
violates law. Thus, a manager that causes a firm to engage in risk-taking will 
not, for purposes of this Article, be acting wrongfully (or be a wrongdoer) if 
such risk-taking does not violate law.39 
The substantive source of confusion is that the failure of a “systemically 
important” firm40 can harm not only its investors but also, by triggering a 
 
 33 Id. at 651 & n.12. 
 34 See infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing public control through privately enforced 
rights). 
 35 Hurt, supra note 22, at 258–59; e.g., Miller, supra note 30, at 89–90. Other private remedies are 
available too, including the ability of investors to sell their securities and to cause poor managers to be 
removed. Hurt, supra note 22, at 258.  
 36 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk). The 
“real economy” means the economic reality, such as a recession, that people actually experience.  
 37 See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints 
on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 
1438, 1441, 1465 (2010) (observing the controversy over “whether there is any such thing as excessive risk, 
and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined”).  
 38 See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. Another factor causing this confusion is that, because 
the law increasingly lags financial innovation, many actions taken by financial firms will not be illegal when 
taken although they may later become illegal. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 39 Cf. infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (observing that economic harm is not always caused by 
wrongdoers).  
 40 This Article’s analysis is not limited to banks or even to financial firms generally. Rather, it should 
apply to any type of firm whose failure could have systemic consequences. The United States and other 
foreign governments are currently grappling with how to define those types of firms. Cf. Daniel Schwarcz & 
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systemic collapse, the public at large.41 Current law does not require firms to 
fully internalize that cost.42 As a result, a firm may well decide to engage in a 
transaction that is expected to be profitable—thereby favorable to its investors 
and thus appropriate corporate risk-taking under existing corporate governance 
law—even though doing so could increase systemic risk. That’s because much 
of the harm from a resulting systemic collapse would be externalized onto 
other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an 
economic collapse.43 This could be described as a type of “tragedy of the 
commons,”44 insofar as market participants suffer from the actions of other 
market participants.45 But it also is a more standard externality insofar as non-
market participants, such as the ordinary citizens impacted by an economic 
collapse, suffer from the actions of market participants.46 
Whatever one calls this cost, neither firms nor their investors have a clear 
duty to the public to internalize it.47 Indeed, nobody is speaking for the public’s 
interest in avoiding systemic harm when firms engage in corporate risk-taking. 
That voice needs to be heard as part of the determination of whether corporate 
risk-taking is excessive.48 Part III examines how that could be done.49 
 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1580–84 (2014) 
(discussing the criteria of interconnectedness, substitutability, and size that governments are using to define 
systemically important firms).  
 41 Miller, supra note 30, at 109–10 (observing that when different types of “excessive risk” are 
distinguished, the type that may have been the actual cause of the financial crisis may be different from the 
type used to justify imposition of personal liability); Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 206 (observing that harm to 
the real economy hurts the public). 
 42 Cf. Viral Acharya et al., How to Measure and Regulate Systemic Risk, NYU LEONARD N. STERN SCH. 
BUS., 1, 4, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/measuring_and_regulating_systemic_ 
risk-1.pdf (arguing that current financial regulation does not provide the incentives to internalize negative 
externalities) (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 43 Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 206. The collapse of Lehman Brothers illustrates this. Lehman Brothers 
had engaged in highly profitable, but also high-risk and high-leverage, business strategies. The financial 
stresses caused by “defaults in the subprime mortgage and commercial real estate markets” then caused 
Lehman Brothers to default, roiling financial markets and threatening the entire U.S. economy with collapse. 
Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—Lehman Brothers, 
General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1115 (2011). 
 44 Miller, supra note 30, at 117 (describing this as “an example of a well-understood type of collective 
action problem—a tragedy of the commons”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 206. 
 45 Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
815, 821. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Creditors, for example, still try to protect their (risk-averse) interests through contractual covenants, 
but those covenants do not purport, and are not required, to protect against systemic risk. 
 48 Cf. Miller, supra note 30, at 109–10 (arguing that the difficulty of imposing personal liability for 
excessive risk-taking stems from the fact that there are various meanings of excessive risk, including 
“excessive systemic risk, that is, risk in excess of what can be socially justified”). 
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2. Decision-Making is Becoming More Decentralized 
Another reason for the decline of personal liability may be the increasingly 
decentralized nature of decision-making at large financial services firms, 
which makes it difficult to assign personal liability for excessive risk-taking. 
Senior executives do not even get involved in the design of potentially risky 
financial products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).50 
Former Attorney General Holder has intimated that this decentralized 
decision-making is intended to protect managers from personal liability: 
“corporations are structured to blur lines of authority and prevent responsibility 
for individual business decisions from residing with a single person.”51 In 
reality, though, it may well be intended to maximize corporate efficiency and 
innovation. Decentralization is said to have “three general benefits: (1) it 
encourages motivation and creativity; (2) it allows many minds to work 
simultaneously on the same problem; and (3) it accommodates flexibility and 
individualization.”52 Business scholars also argue that decentralized 
decision-making is necessary in a globalized economy, providing firms with 
“the much needed flexibility to deal with rapidly changing market 
conditions.”53 
Whatever the intention, a side effect of decentralized decision-making is to 
make it more difficult to assign risk-taking responsibility, and thus to impose 
personal liability for excessive risk-taking. 
 
 49 See infra Part III.A. 
 50 CDOs are asset-backed securities that are backed by—and thus their payment derives principally or 
entirely from—a mixed pool of mortgage loans, other financial assets owned by a special-purpose entity, or 
both. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown,  
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008). By using CDOs as an example, I am not suggesting that designing a CDO 
is inherently bad, much less illegal. In my experience, if the financial assets backing a CDO are diversified 
loan obligations, the CDO’s securities may well be a prudent investment. Greater risk can arise, however, 
where those financial assets themselves consist of already leveraged asset-backed securities (ABS) or 
derivatives (such as credit–default swaps). Id. at 376–77, 376 n.19. CDO transactions involving financial 
assets consisting of ABS or derivatives are sometimes referred to as “resecuritizations” or ABS CDO 
transactions—the latter term referring to a CDO of ABS. Id. at 376–77. An ABS CDO transaction backed by 
derivatives is sometimes also referred to as a “synthetic” transaction. Id. at 376 n.19.  
 51 Holder, supra note 18. 
 52 Thomas W. Malone, Making the Decision to Decentralize, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE 
(Mar. 29, 2004), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4020.html; cf. Chris Joseph, The Advantages of a Decentralized 
Organizational Structure, HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-decentralized-
organizational-structure-603.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (arguing that decentralization empowers 
employees, creates more efficient decision-making, and eases the burden of expansion). 
 53 PANOS MOURDOUKOUTAS, BUSINESS STRATEGY IN A SEMIGLOBAL ECONOMY 125 (2006). 
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B. Changes in Law’s Intersection with Finance 
Changes in how the law intersects with finance may also be impeding the 
imposition of personal liability for excessive risk-taking. 
1. The Law Increasingly Is Lagging Financial Innovation 
One such change is that, as the financial industry and financial products 
become more complex, the law increasingly lags financial innovation.54 Even 
when regulators acquire industry information, it may be of only limited 
relevance to the current situation.55 That time lag goes to information 
acquisition—in other words, the lag in regulators obtaining information. The 
increasing income disparity, now more than two-to-one, between financial 
industry employees and their government regulatory counterparts may even be 
lengthening the time lag by making it more difficult for financial regulators to 
understand and process complex information once obtained.56 
Whatever is causing the time lag, it is real—and many risky actions by 
financial firms will not be illegal when taken. Therefore, the executives who 
determine and manage those actions will not be acting illegally at the time. 
 
 54 See, e.g., ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 500 (2014). Gerding stated 
that 
another persistent challenge to financial regulators . . . [is] keeping up with the pace of private 
sector financial innovation. The rapid development of new financial instruments, transactions, 
and markets confounds the ability of regulators to understand the true purpose behind these 
inventions . . . let alone to spot systemic and other risks. 
Id.; Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1934 (“Regulators must 
manage complexity. The development of new financial products stresses the capacity of regulators to keep up 
and understand how to regulate these instruments.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial 
Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 240 (2009).  
 55 Cf. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise 
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1499 (1993) (arguing that regulators cannot keep up with 
the development of complex derivatives products because of the time lag); Edward J. Kane, Hair of the Dog 
that Bit Us: The Insufficiency of New and Improved Capital Requirements 6 (Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www2.bc.edu/edward-kane/HAIR%20OF%20THE%20DOG%20THAT%20BIT%20US. 
pdf (“In the metagame of controlling regulation-induced risk-taking, regulators are outcoached, outgunned, 
and always playing from behind.”).  
 56 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial 
Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2015) (discussing how income disparity, coupled with the 
complexity of financial products and markets, creates “information asymmetry” between regulators and the 
industry). 
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2. Systemic Harm Is Limiting Proof of Causation 
Another change impeding the imposition of personal liability for excessive 
risk-taking is that the primary harm now caused by financial failure—systemic 
harm—limits the application of tort law. Tort law, which is part of what 
Richard Posner calls public control through the common law system of 
privately enforced rights,57 has long been a fundamental tool to impose 
personal civil liability to remedy harm for unreasonable risk-taking.58 Its utility 
is limited, however, to remedying foreseeable harm.59 But systemic harm is 
rarely foreseeable.60 
Systemic harm instead affects a wide range of third parties in unpredictable 
ways. Consider, for example, an individual who is forced to close her 
family-owned restaurant during a systemically caused recession. Or taking a 
more concrete example from the financial crisis, consider whether to impose 
tort liability on a manager of a financial firm who, in the expectation of a 
bonus, sells risky ABS CDO securities61 to investors, contributing to that 
crisis. Tort law could not—and probably should not—be used to impose 
personal liability on that manager for the resulting systemic harm.62 
 
 57 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
 58 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: 
Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & 
DEV. L.J. 113, 127 (2010) (observing that the concept of “[i]mposing liability to pay the damages resulting 
from unreasonable risks . . . . is a pillar of tort law”).  
 59 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About 
Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22 (2014).  
 60 Id.  
 61 See supra note 50 (explaining ABS CDO securities). 
 62 Arguably, another example of a change in the intersection of law and finance that is impeding the 
imposition of personal liability might be that regulatory coordination is diminishing. Financial regulators 
sometimes attempt to coordinate their efforts in order to increase effective regulation and decrease duplication. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION 
COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 20 (2011). Professor Utset argues, for 
example, that a regulatory agency may delay imposing personal liability for financial wrongdoing due to a 
mistaken belief that another agency will. Manuel A. Utset, Rational Financial Meltdowns, 10 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 407, 430–31 (2014). This coordination problem is especially problematic where multiple agencies—such 
as the SEC, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the DOJ—have jurisdiction. See id. 
Therefore, this coordination problem will ultimately lead to under-enforcement if each of the agencies 
mistakenly believes that another agency is taking care of the problem. Id. The problem with this example is 
that, in response to the financial crisis, the Dodd–Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) to “facilitate interagency coordination by facilitating information sharing and coordination among its 
member agencies and other federal and state agencies on the development of financial services policy, 
rulemaking, examinations, reporting requirements, and enforcement actions.” U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., supra at 21 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(E)). Therefore, even if regulatory coordination was 
diminishing prior to the financial crisis, it now is likely to increase. 
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In contrast, tort law might be more effective in internalizing systemic harm 
when applied to firms, rather than individuals.63 Civil damages can be imposed 
on firms for “all harms, regardless of foreseeability, under the allocation-of-
resources justification of enterprise liability.”64 The reasoning behind 
enterprise liability is “that prices should reflect the ‘actual costs’ of goods so as 
to allow purchasers to make informed decisions.”65 Therefore, “‘the cost of 
injuries should be borne by the activities which caused them,’ regardless of 
fault, because injuries represent a ‘real cost’ of those activities.”66 Further, 
“[f]oreseeability is irrelevant under enterprise liability because unforeseeable 
harms are ‘just as truly costs’ of doing business as foreseeable harms.”67 
C. Changes in Prosecutorial Behavior 
Changes in prosecutorial behavior may also be impeding the imposition of 
personal liability for excessive risk-taking. The analysis below first examines 
the impact of prosecutors becoming more risk averse, arguing that is unlikely 
to be an impediment. Thereafter, the analysis examines the impact of a 
diminishment in prosecutorial resources, arguing that this diminishment is 
more clearly an impediment to the imposition of personal liability.68 
1. Awareness of Adverse Consequences Is Creating Risk Aversion 
The increased awareness that a prosecution can have adverse economic 
consequences is creating prosecutorial risk aversion. As explained below, 
however, that risk aversion should not be relevant to imposing personal 
liability. 
 
 63 Recall that tort law constitutes public control through privately enforced rights. See infra note 139 and 
accompanying text. Another reason that tort law might be more effective in internalizing systemic harm when 
applied to firms, rather than individuals, is that “the notion of risk in torts is very different from the notion of 
risk in finance.” Miller, supra note 30, at 122. 
 64 Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom-to-Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE L.J. 767, 789–90, 
789 n.108 (2012) (citing Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 529 (1961)).  
 65 Id. at 789. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 789–90. 
 68 Judge Rakoff suggests that there is another reason why changes in prosecutorial behavior may be 
impeding the imposition of personal liability: the reluctance to prosecute may partly derive from the federal 
government’s own role in inadvertently triggering the financial crisis, including de-regulation, lax banking 
oversight, keeping interest rates low, and the encouragement of subprime lending to provide housing for low-
income people. See Rakoff, supra note 24. Any such reluctance, however, should logically apply not only to 
imposing personal liability but also to imposing firm-level liability.  
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The seminal event triggering awareness that a prosecution can have adverse 
economic consequences was the 2002 criminal prosecution and conviction of 
accounting giant Arthur Andersen, which resulted in the firm’s demise and the 
loss of tens of thousands of jobs.69 At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on 
March 6, 2013, then-Attorney General Eric Holder told lawmakers that 
prosecuting financial crimes could have a negative economic impact, and that 
this concern has impacted prosecutorial decisions.70 Similarly, Assistant 
Attorney General Lanny Breuer has publicly observed that the Justice 
Department is presented with arguments from defense counsel, senior 
executives, and economists that an indictment could cause a bank to fail, 
innocent employees to lose jobs, shareholders to suffer, and the health of entire 
industries and global markets to be impacted—and that he finds some of these 
arguments convincing.71 
Whether the potential for adverse economic consequences should make 
prosecutors risk averse when imposing firm-level liability,72 it should not make 
them risk averse when imposing personal liability. Prosecuting individuals 
should be far less likely to cause adverse economic consequences than 
prosecuting firms because the former is much less likely to cause a firm’s 
demise. This raises all the more the question of why the trend is to impose 
firm-level, and not personal, liability.73 At least part of the answer, as 
explained below, is the diminishment in prosecutorial resources. 
 
 69 United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the trial court’s 
conviction of Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice for destroying Enron’s documents after the 
government commenced its investigation of Enron’s accounting), rev’d, Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); Jesse Eisinger, The Fall Guy: There’s a Reason Only One Top Banker Went to 
Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 4, 2014, at 34. Ironically, this conviction was overturned 
by the Supreme Court in 2005 because the trial court erred by granting the government’s request to loosen the 
standard jury instructions. Andersen, 544 U.S. 696. 
 70 Randall W. Forsyth, Too Big to Jail, BARRON’S, March 11, 2013, at 5. Attorney General Holder 
expressed concerns that “if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact 
on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” Id. Holder later said his comments were 
misconstrued. In a weekly video address, he promised aggressive enforcement, saying that there was no such 
thing as “too big to jail,” clarifying that enforcement should be coupled with consultation with regulators to 
avoid broader economic impacts. The Justice Department, No Company or Individual Is Too Big to Jail, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odWZUloCWhM.  
 71 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Criminal Div., Address at the New York 
City Bar Association: The Role of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in White Collar Criminal Law 
Enforcement (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-
speaks-new-york-city-bar-association.  
 72 The precedents cited go to firm-level criminal liability, sometimes referred to as “too big to jail.” I 
later discuss firm-level civil liability. See infra Part II.  
 73 Professor Levitin raises other possible explanations for prosecutorial risk aversion. One is the “deep 
personal, cultural, financial and political ties” between the administration and Wall Street as well as a “fear 
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2. Shrinking of Resources Is Tightening Risk-Reward Assessment 
Like everyone else, prosecutors have limited resources.74 Post September 
11, 2001, a number of government agencies that previously investigated the 
financial industry lost some of their resources to anti-terrorism investigations.75 
Moreover, after the Madoff fraud, the SEC attempted to “deflect criticism from 
its failure to detect” that fraud by concentrating on Ponzi-like schemes, thereby 
further diverting resources that would have been available for prosecuting 
other types of financial failures.76 
Prosecutors are thus under increasing pressure to spend their resources for 
maximum impact. Logically, they will choose the prosecutorial routes that, for 
the money spent, best balances risk and reward. Outside of clear-cut fraud 
cases, that route often involves pursuing firms—which are more likely to settle 
as a cost of doing business77— not individuals.78 
Pursuing individuals can be very costly. Prosecutors will often have to start 
their investigation by ferreting out and gathering basic information and 
 
that the Obama administration would be accused of an anti-business witch hunt if it went after Wall Street.” 
Joe Nocera, Opinion, The Hole in Holder’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/30/opinion/joe-nocera-the-hole-in-holders-legacy.html (quoting Professor Levitin in a personal email 
to the author). Again, this explanation fails to account for the move to prosecute firms rather than individuals. 
Another explanation Nocera advances for prosecutorial risk aversion is “a lack of understanding of the 
products and markets involved.” Id. 
 74 See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial 
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 224 (2003) (“Scarce resources . . . dictate that prosecutors will be 
unable to pursue each matter that is placed upon their desk for consideration.”); cf. Adam M. Gershowitz & 
Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal 
Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2011) (“Because they are overburdened, prosecutors—who are 
sworn to achieve justice, not to win at all costs—lack the time and resources to carefully assess which 
defendants are most deserving of punishment.”). Gershowitz and Killinger further explain that 
“[o]verburdened prosecutors who lack the time to thoroughly investigate cases, subpoena witnesses, meet with 
experts, and complete a host of other tasks will find themselves disadvantaged at trial. Guilty defendants who 
should be convicted go free because prosecutors lack the time and resources necessary to win at trial.” Id. at 
265; cf. Utset, supra note 62, at 429 (arguing that regulators delay monitoring and disciplining financial 
institutions because of budgetary limitations).  
 75 Rakoff, supra note 18, at 6. Judge Rakoff observes that 
before 2001, the FBI had more than one thousand agents assigned to investigating financial frauds, 
but after September 11 many of these agents were shifted to antiterrorism work. Who can argue 
with that? Yet the result was that, by 2007 or so, there were only 120 agents reviewing the more 
than 50,000 reports of mortgage fraud filed by the banks. 
Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 78 See text accompanying notes 1–6.  
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evidence, which can take months if not years of work.79 The rate of successful 
prosecutions is also low, perhaps in part due to a self-reinforcing trend: as 
prosecutors spend less time engaged in actual litigation, their trial skills can 
diminish.80 Thus, a prominent commentator argues that recent changes, 
focusing on reaching settlements, in the Justice Department’s approach to 
white collar crime has diminished that Department’s expertise to litigate and 
win trials involving financial complexity, particularly against top-notch law 
firms representing defendants.81 
Juries may also be reluctant to hold individuals liable, even for monetary 
damages.82 The SEC, for example, brought federal securities law civil actions 
against Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.83 and Brian Stoker,84 the executive 
principally responsible for structuring and marketing securities of a risky and 
highly complex synthetic ABS CDO transaction, backed by credit–default 
swaps on other CDOs whose value was tied to the U.S. housing market.85 
Following a two-week trial, a jury found Stoker not liable.86 The jury 
apparently did not want to make Stoker a scapegoat.87 
 
 79 See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1281 (2011) (arguing that wrongdoing insiders are rarely sanctioned due to prohibitive costs and 
managers’ control of discovering individual identities and actions of this information); Eisinger, supra note 69, 
at 34.  
 80 Nocera, supra note 73 (“[O]ver the years, the [U.S.] Justice Department saw ‘an erosion of the 
department’s actual trial skills.’” (quoting Eisenger, supra note 69, at 34)). 
 81 Eisinger, supra note 69. In the Justice Department’s single foray into bringing a criminal case against 
individuals involved in the financial crisis, the two accused Bear Stearns hedge fund managers were acquitted. 
Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A.1, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125788421912541971. Jurors found there was no evidence of criminal intent 
beyond a reasonable doubt, with one juror saying that the prosecution had not provided enough information. 
Id.; cf. Zaring, supra note 4, at 1441 (arguing that the lack of prosecutions following the financial crisis is due, 
in part, to the government’s belief that these cases are too difficult to win). 
 82 Recall that this Article focuses on civil personal liability. Cf. supra notes 20–23 and accompanying 
text (explaining this limited focus). 
 83 SEC v. Citigroup Global Capital Mkts., 827 F. Supp. 2d. 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated, 752 F.3d 
285 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 84 SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 85 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 50 (explaining ABS CDO transactions). The SEC alleged, among other 
things, that $500 million of the assets included in the ABS CDO had been falsely marketed to investors as 
having been selected by a third party, using the third party’s proprietary selection process, and that the 
marketing materials failed to disclose that Citigroup separately bet against those assets. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 
2d at 462. 
 86 Peter Lattman, A Jury’s Message for Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2012, at B1, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EED71739F937A3575BC0A9649D8B63. 
 87 Id. (quoting the jury foreman as wondering why Citigroup’s CEO wasn’t on trial). The jury also issued 
the following statement, which was read by presiding Judge Rakoff: “This verdict should not deter the S.E.C. 
from investigating the financial industry, to review current regulations and modify existing regulations as 
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At least in part because of these costs, personal liability is now rarely 
pursued in complex financial cases, and, when it is, it is primarily through civil 
settlements that do not admit wrongdoing. In March 2014, for example, former 
Bank of America chief executive, Kenneth Lewis, settled a civil prosecution 
regarding an alleged failure to disclose increasing losses at Merrill Lynch & 
Co. prior to its acquisition.88 The settlement required Lewis to pay $10 million 
and accept a three-year ban from working at any public company, but it did not 
require him to admit any wrongdoing.89 
In contrast to the hurdles involved in pursuing personal liability, 
prosecutors pursuing firm-level liability have a clearer and easier path. 
Generally, they start by inviting the company’s counsel to discuss the 
possibility of an investigation.90 Such counsel will ask the prosecutors to defer 
the investigation until counsel does an internal investigation; in return, the 
company will share the results of its investigation with the prosecutors.91 After 
sharing those results, the company and the prosecutors will decide what 
mistakes were made and—sometimes memorialized through a deferred 
prosecution agreement92—how the company will avoid those mistakes in the 
future.93 Although the executives are not prosecuted, future mistakes will, 
hopefully, be prevented, and the government will save on time and resources.94  
II. SHOULD MORE BE DONE TO IMPOSE PERSONAL LIABILITY? 
The discussion so far has shown that changes in firms and markets, in the 
intersection of law and finance, and in prosecutorial behavior are creating real 
impediments to the imposition of personal liability for excessive risk-taking. 
These impediments include confusion about what risk-taking is excessive; the 
 
necessary.” Peter Lattman, Jury Clears Ex-Manager at Citigroup in Debt Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at 
B1, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE5DD1230F932A3575BC0A9649D8B63; see also 
Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis Prosecutions? Ex-Justice Official Says It’s Just Too Hard, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 6, 2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/why-no-financial-crisis-prosecutions-
official-says-its-just-too-hard.  
 88 James Sterngold, Dan Fitzpatrick & Nick Timiraos, BofA, Ex-CEO Lewis Settle Crisis-Era Suits, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230468810457946356 
2665472416.  
 89 Id. 
 90 Rakoff, supra note 18. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 93 Rakoff, supra note 18.  
 94 But see Rakoff, supra note 18. Even tort law might be more effective, as discussed, when applied to 
firms rather than to individuals. See Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 64; see also Miller, supra note 30, at 122. 
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increasingly decentralized nature of decision-making at large financial services 
firms, which makes it difficult to assign personal liability; heightened 
complexity, which causes the law increasingly to lag financial innovation; and 
shrinking resources, which increase pressure on prosecutors to spend for 
maximum impact and, in turn, motivates them to often pursue firms, not 
individuals. Anything more that is done to impose personal liability would 
have to avoid these impediments. 
This Part examines whether, at least in theory, more should be done to try 
to impose personal liability for excessive corporate risk-taking. The 
examination first considers whether firm-level liability is sufficient to control 
and internalize the costs of that risk-taking. Thereafter, it considers whether 
firm-level liability can efficiently control and internalize those costs. These 
inquiries show that firm-level liability may well be insufficient, and almost 
certainly will be inefficient, to control and internalize those costs. Part III of 
this Article then explores what more could be done, given the aforesaid 
impediments, to impose personal liability. 
A. Is Firm-Level Liability a Sufficient Deterrent? 
Recall that firm-level liability is a second-best deterrent because firms are 
managed by individuals.95 Many nonetheless view firm-level liability as a 
valuable deterrent when it is imposed through deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs).96 Former Assistant Attorney General Breuer has argued, for example, 
that firm-level DPAs can bring large settlements and oversight that can have 
great punitive and deterrent effect.97 He explains that a deferred prosecution 
agreement is a powerful tool because 
when a company enters into a DPA with the government, . . . it 
almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to cooperate 
with the government’s investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve its 
 
 95 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 96 A DPA is a contractual arrangement between a firm and the government that enables the firm to avoid 
prosecution in return for agreeing to act responsibly in the future. See Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The 
Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013,  
70 BUS. LAW. 61, 63 (2015). In a typical DPA, the government “imposes sanctions, such as fines, restitution, 
and institutional changes,” or imposes particular reporting duties. Id. If (as applicable) the firm observes those 
sanctions, pays the fines and restitution, makes the requested changes, and provides the reporting, it can avoid 
prosecution. Id. This Article uses the more common term, DPA, to also include a non-prosecution agreement 
(NPA). Technically, a DPA refers to an arrangement that dismisses filed charges and an NPA refers to an 
arrangement not to file charges in the first place. Id. 
 97 See Breuer, supra note 71. 
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compliance program, and agree to face prosecution if it fails to satisfy 
the terms of the agreement. All of these components of DPAs are 
critical for accountability.98 
Professor Arlen also observes that a DPA can incentivize firms to monitor, 
police, and deter crime by creating or improving internal compliance programs 
under the threat of firm-level sanctions.99 
But the fact that firm-level liability in the form of DPAs can be a valuable 
deterrent does not prove it is a sufficient deterrent. Some question whether 
DPAs provide adequate sanctions.100 Others question whether firms always 
comply with them. Professor Brandon Garrett has found, for example, that 
since 2001 at least eight large banks have continued to engage in actions 
prohibited by the DPAs.101 And recent media articles are reporting that several 
major financial institutions are being reinvestigated for possible DPA 
violations.102 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS CRIMINAL LAW 144, 169 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012); cf. Kaal & Lacine, supra 
note 96, at 62, 119 (arguing that deferred and non-prosecution agreements have increased substantially in 
recent years and have led to broad changes and improvements to corporate governance). 
 100 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 1, 19 (2012) (“[DPAs] allow egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly. 
Because the government does not file actual charges to which a company must plead, such conduct is often 
resolved without adequate sanctions and without achieving maximum deterrence.”). 
 101 Brandon L. Garrett, Recidivist Banks, BRANDON L. GARRETT (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www. 
brandonlgarrett.com/blog/2014/10/30/recidivist-banks. Garrett further observes that the DPAs implemented 
from 2001 to 2012 have been largely ineffective due, in part, to fines that have lacked any meaningful impact. 
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 67–70 
(2014). DPAs also have failed to require companies to assess the effectiveness of compliance programs, and 
there have been very few monitors overseeing such agreements:  
[T]he more I have examined how prosecutors have actually implemented the [DPA] approach, 
the more troubled I have become. Prosecutors allow many large companies to avoid an 
indictment or a conviction, largely freeing them from judicial oversight . . . .  
. . . The terms of these agreements often lack any rigorous structural reforms. Most did 
require the creation of some kind of compliance program (63 percent, or 160 of 255 agreements), 
but only a quarter called for independent monitors to supervise compliance, and fewer required 
evaluating the effectiveness of compliance. . . . The agreements were short-lived, lasting for an 
average of just over two years. It is doubtful that a large company’s culture can be reformed in so 
little time. Despite the genuine ambition of the new approach, reading the terms of these 
agreements tells us something quite unsettling about how large corporate prosecutions are 
actually resolved.  
Id. at 47–48.  
 102 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Repeat Offenses Are Suspected on Wall Street, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014, at A1. For example, prosecutors in Washington and New York are investigating whether 
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Most germane to this Article, it is uncertain whether prosecutors would 
attempt—and if they did, whether they legally would have the right—to apply 
DPAs to deter excessive corporate risk-taking, even risk-taking that results in 
systemic harm. DPAs are normally applied only to deter crime and other illegal 
actions.103 Excessive corporate risk-taking, however, is not (and should not 
necessarily be) illegal.104 
It therefore remains uncertain whether firm-level liability, even in the form 
of DPAs, is a sufficient deterrent to control and internalize the costs of 
excessive corporate risk-taking. As explained below, however, whether or not 
DPAs and other forms of firm-level liability are a sufficient deterrent, they are 
not an efficient deterrent. 
B. Is Firm-Level Liability an Efficient Deterrent? 
Firm-level liability is generally regarded as inefficient because it imposes 
significant externalities: the punishment goes beyond those who are 
responsible, impacting third parties. I have already mentioned the prosecution 
of Arthur Andersen, which caused tens of thousands of employees to lose their 
jobs.105 Firm-level liability that causes a firm to fail would harm not only 
employees: it would hurt shareholders and creditors, and it might impact the 
health of entire industries and global markets.106 Even if the firm does not fail 
and employees retain their jobs, firm-level liability (such as a fine) will be 
 
the British bank, Standard Chartered, repeatedly violated a DPA entered into as part of a 2012 settlement over 
accusations that it transferred billions of dollars to nations blacklisted by the United States. Id. As Protess and 
Silver-Greenberg point out, “The cycle of misbehavior is difficult to break. Regulators and prosecutors blame 
a culture that prioritizes profit over compliance. And as banks have grown larger, and more international, 
illegality can stop in one unit of a bank even as it flourishes in another.” Id. 
 103 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS TAKEN 
STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD 
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2009) (“DOJ views DPAs and NPAs as appropriate tools to use in cases where 
the goals of punishing and deterring criminal behavior, providing restitution to victims, and reforming 
otherwise law-abiding companies can be achieved without criminal prosecution.”); cf. Jed S. Rakoff, Justice 
Deferred Is Justice Denied, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/ 
2015/feb/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied/ (observing that the “intellectual origins” of DPAs “can be traced 
back at least to the 1980s, when various academics suggested that the best way to deter ‘crime in the suites’ 
was to foster a culture within companies of acting ethically and responsibly”). 
 104 See supra text accompanying note 39; cf. infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text (observing that 
economic harm is not always caused by wrongdoers). Furthermore, until this Article, excessive systemic 
corporate risk-taking had not even been clearly defined. 
 105 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 106 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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detrimental to people who were not necessarily culpable, such as stockholders 
and creditors, who will suffer a loss in the value of their securities.107 
Some argue that imposing firm-level liability in the form of DPAs could 
avoid that harm, while still being an effective deterrent.108 Indeed, the 
“avoidance of collateral consequences is the most commonly cited reason for 
the use of” DPAs.109 If a firm complies with a DPA, it should be able to avoid 
having to actually pay a fine. As indicated, however, the reality is that not all 
firms comply with their DPAs.110 
There also is a risk that the very fact that DPAs are becoming a standard 
first step in enforcement will inadvertently undermine compliance. A firm that 
anticipates merely becoming subject to a DPA rather than being prosecuted or 
fined will have a reduced incentive to comply in the first instance. DPAs, in 
other words, might actually create moral hazard by protecting firms against the 
adverse consequences of their own actions.111 
In short, although DPAs could be a helpful way to impose firm-level 
liability, more should be done to impose personal liability in order to control 
and internalize the costs of excessive corporate risk-taking. Next, Part III of 
this Article will discuss what more could be done to achieve that. 
 
 107 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981).  
 108 See, e.g., Kaal & Lacine, supra note 96, at 63–64. 
 109 Id. at 69. 
 110 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (observing that some firms continue to engage in 
actions prohibited by DPAs); see also Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and 
the Impact on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1312 n.126 
(2013) (citing Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Debate About Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, 248 N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2012, at 3 (“DPAs . . . allow[] corporate criminals to receive no more than 
a slap on the wrist and make the decision to police criminal activity within a corporation ‘just another dollars-
and-cents decision.’” (alteration in original))). 
 111 A partial solution to reduce this moral hazard might be for prosecutors to utilize constructive 
ambiguity, sometimes offering firms DPAs and sometimes prosecuting or fining them. The use of constructive 
ambiguity prior to the financial crisis to try to reduce moral hazard suggests, however, that it can be 
ineffective. Once the Federal Reserve bailed out Bear Stearns, everyone expected it to bail out Lehman 
Brothers. U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 482–83. Moreover, the shock caused by the 
Fed’s failure to bail out Lehman Brothers was the final straw that triggered the collapse that led to the financial 
crisis. See id. (explaining that market participants did not expect the Federal Reserve to fail to rescue Lehman 
after Bear’s bailout and, thus, the resulting economic uncertainty caused the banks to hoard cash and stop all 
lending to other banks). 
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III. WHAT MORE COULD BE DONE? 
This Part examines possible proposals to impose personal liability to 
control and internalize the costs of excessive corporate risk-taking, without 
undermining economic progress. The proposals are designed to respond to, 
among other things, the impediments discussed in Part I of this Article.112 They 
do not purport to respond, however, to the impediment that the shrinking of 
prosecutorial resources is tightening risk-reward assessment;113 increasing 
those resources would inherently be a political decision.114 
To help ensure that the proposals do not inadvertently undermine economic 
progress,115 each proposal is subjected to a policy-level cost–benefit 
analysis.116 Cost–benefit analysis is always inherently imperfect, however, 
being influenced by subjectivity in choosing and quantifying the costs and the 
benefits.117 In assessing the proposals, these imperfections include not only 
uncertainty over the extent that risk-taking by financial firms can be beneficial 
to the real economy118 but also, more significantly, the fact that the failure of 
 
 112 See supra Part I (discussing the changes impeding the imposition of personal liability). 
 113 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 114 There might be legal ways, however, to try to increase the effectiveness of those resources, such as by 
outsourcing prosecutions to expert trial lawyers. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House 
Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008) (examining the comparative efficiency of using in-
house lawyers or hiring outside counsel).  
 115 Cf. Manuel Sánchez, Financial Innovation and the Global Crisis, 5 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT., Nov. 
2010, at 26, 31 (arguing that in order to reduce the possibility of future financial instability, “regulation and 
supervision should help align the incentives of market participants towards prudent risk taking,” which can be 
accomplished without impeding financial innovation). 
 116 A “cost–benefit analysis,” which in economic terms parallels a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency analysis, 
generally seeks to provide guidance on the formation of policy by comparing the policy’s benefits and costs. 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037, 1037–39 (2000). Its main 
justification is pragmatic, in that it “often seems to improve the quality of decisions.” Richard A. Posner, Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1159 
(2000) (quoting Kornhauser, supra, at 1038). It also can promote efficiency; see, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1983, 2010 (2013) (arguing that cost–benefit analysis promotes efficiency by helping to achieve better 
outcomes, reduce cognitive biases, and more effectively set priorities).  
 117 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE. L.J. 882, 968 (2015). Coates examines how cost–benefit analysis would work in 
practice if applied to financial regulation. To that end, he engages in case studies of six financial rules. He 
finds that quantified cost–benefit analysis of those rules can be no more than “guesstimated.” Id. at 1011. 
 118 Some have argued, at least informally, that financial innovations are inherently less valuable than 
technological innovations. But cf. Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1533, 1568 (2013) (“The 
primary function of the capital markets is to allocate scarce resources among different projects, ideally based 
upon the expected returns of each.”); Sánchez, supra note 115, at 26–28 (arguing that, as long as excessive 
risk-taking is discouraged, financial innovation can directly improve economic well-being, benefit societies, 
increase material well-being, allocate financial resources to their most productive uses, lower the cost of 
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systemically important firms could have massive but somewhat unquantifiable 
harmful consequences to the real economy.119 
This Article’s cost–benefit analysis will therefore focus more on 
inequalities than equations—not yielding precise numbers but merely 
attempting to determine the likely relative balance of costs and benefits. 
Furthermore, because the failure of systemically important firms could have 
massively harmful consequences, the analysis considers the possibility of 
taking into account a precautionary principle. Precautionary principles 
generally direct “regulators to err on the side of regulating an activity when the 
outcome of that activity is uncertain, but potentially irreversible and 
catastrophic.”120 Although precautionary principles have been mostly applied 
in assessing environmental regulation,121 they also could have application to 
financial regulation where, as in the case of this Article, there are potentially 
systemic consequences.122 
In implementing a precautionary principle, it is helpful to understand the 
principle’s different forms. Under the weak form of the principle, the “lack of 
 
capital, and benefit households and corporations); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at 
the Federal Reserve System’s Sixth Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference: Financial Innovation 
and Consumer Protection (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 
20090417a.htm (arguing that “financial innovation has improved access to credit, reduced costs, and increased 
choice” in the financial markets, as illustrated by the development of the secondary mortgage market—which 
has given “mortgage lenders greater access to the capital markets, lower[ed] transaction costs, and spread[] 
risk more broadly”—and the innovation of credit cards, which has improved communications, management of 
data, and credit scoring).  
 119 E.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the financial crisis as an “economic assault that 
cost millions of Americans their jobs and homes, while wiping out investors, good businesses, and markets”); 
cf. Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Speech Before the Institute of International 
and European Affairs: Global Banking: A Failure of Structural Integrity (Dec. 13, 2013) (observing that the 
concentration and complexity of banking institutions have left the U.S. economy increasingly vulnerable to 
industry mistakes, with the eight largest U.S. global systemically important banking firms collectively holding 
$15 trillion in assets or the equivalent of 90% of GDP). In contrast, the failure of ordinary firms principally 
impacts only their shareholders and creditors. 
 120 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 191 
(2013). 
 121 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 16 (2d ed. 
2007). 
 122 Allen, supra note 120, at 191–92; see also Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of 
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 84 (2012) (“[A]dopting and operationalizing the 
general concept of precaution in the context of post-crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a 
worthwhile, and even necessary, exercise.”); Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 234–35 (applying a precautionary 
principle to cost–benefit balancing involving systemic risk). 
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decisive evidence of harm should not be grounds for refusing to regulate.”123 
That, however, provides no real guidance on whether to regulate. The strong 
form of the precautionary principle suggests that the “potential for great harm 
justifies any regulatory intervention, and/or that the proponent of an activity 
must conclusively demonstrate that the activity is safe before it is allowed.”124 
That, however, creates an insurmountable burden not only for the proponent 
but also potentially for regulators, who “would be stymied . . . because by 
blocking any new activity for failing to satisfy an impossibly high burden of 
proof, they would necessarily block the benefits of these new activities, and 
blocking the benefits of activities is an inadvertent harm that the regulators 
cannot endorse.”125 In this Article’s context, applying the strong form of the 
precautionary principle would make no sense because it would effectively 
prevent the risk-taking that is necessary for firms to innovate and create 
economic value.126 
There is, however, a semi-strong form of the precautionary principle that is 
sometimes applied to “activities [that] can pose great harm.”127 Under that 
principle, “precautionary regulation should be employed that effectively shifts 
the burden to prove that the activity should be permitted to the proponent of 
that activity, rather than forcing the regulator to make the case for why 
regulation is necessary.”128 This semi-strong form of the precautionary 
principle should be relevant to this Article’s analysis because the failure of 
systemically important firms could trigger a systemic collapse that could 
greatly harm the real economy.129 This Article therefore takes into account that 
form of the precautionary principle—shifting the burden of proving that the 
risk-taking should be permitted onto the proponents of the risk-taking. Because 
of the potential for public harm, this Article additionally takes into account a 
 
 123 Allen, supra note 120, at 195 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (2003)). 
 124 Id. at 195; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 
1014 (2003) (identifying a fourth form of the precautionary principle, under which “[r]egulation should 
include a margin of safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects have not been found or 
predicted”). 
 125 Allen, supra note 120, at 196 n.90. 
 126 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 127 Allen, supra note 120, at 195. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (observing that the failure of systemically important firms 
could have massively harmful consequences to the real economy). 
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variant on that form (also called a “fourth form”) of the precautionary 
principle, which requires a margin of safety.130 
Another question in the cost–benefit analysis is how to quantify the 
public’s desire for retribution for harm caused by excessive risk-taking. This 
Article quantifies that as zero—effectively choosing not to include it as a 
benefit. The desire for retribution is sometimes manufactured by politicians 
and the media, who often perceive that a significant economic harm is a 
“wrong” that must have been caused by a wrongdoer: 
[W]hen significant harm results, the media often reacts by trying to 
identify wrongdoers who should be sent to jail . . . . Recent 
frustration with the Obama administration for not seeking indictments 
in the wake of the global financial crisis and subsequent banking 
failures suggests continued strong impulses for retribution.131 
As explained, however, economic harm is not always caused by wrongdoers, 
and indeed most of the actions leading to the financial crisis were not illegal.132 
Bankers involved with the structuring and implementation of CDO 
transactions, for example, were not necessarily wrongdoers because—
notwithstanding the media frenzy about the evil nature of CDO 
transactions133—those transactions were not all bad and almost certainly were 
not illegal.134 Prosecutors sometimes viscerally respond to political and media 
 
 130 Compare infra text accompanying notes 173–74 (arguing for a “considerably outweigh” requirement 
to justify private benefit that causes public harm), with Sunstein, supra note 124, at 1014 (discussing a 
so-called fourth form of the precautionary principle, requiring a margin of safety). 
 131 Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 64, at 788; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2012) (observing that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 
“showed hints of the public’s desire for retribution”).  
 132 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (observing that such actions mostly represented 
excessive, but not illegal, corporate risk-taking resulting from poor decisions, bad judgment, and greed). 
 133 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 23, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/banks-bundled-bad-debt-
bet-against-it-and-won/ (“The creation and sale of synthetic C.D.O.’s helped make the financial crisis worse 
than it might otherwise have been, effectively multiplying losses by providing more securities to bet against.”); 
Yves Smith, On Goldman’s (and Now Morgan Stanley’s) Deceptive Synthetic CDO Practices (aka Screwing 
Their Customers), NAKED CAPITALISM (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/12/on-
goldmans-and-now-morgan-stanleys-deceptive-synthetic-cdo-practices-aka-screwing-its-customers.html.  
 134 See supra note 50. In other words, there may be a misperception that the government should be 
hunting big game, John C. Coffee, Jr., Address at the University of St. Thomas Law Review Symposium: 
Beyond Crises-Driven Regulation–Initiatives for Sustainable Financial Regulation (Apr. 11, 2014) (transcript 
on file with author), but, mixing metaphors, the “big game” may not have done anything illegal to justify their 
being hunted. 
SCHWARCZ GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/14/2016 2:36 PM 
560 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:533 
pressures,135 which can lead to abuses of government power and process.136 
Quantifying the public’s desire for retribution as zero mitigates the potential 
for these abuses. 
Finally, in examining how to impose personal liability, this Article 
considers not only liability imposed by government directly,137 but also 
liability imposed indirectly by law.138 This flexible approach recognizes that 
optimal regulation should include the choice, depending on weighing their 
strengths and weaknesses in particular contexts, “between two methods of 
public control—the common law system of privately enforced rights and the 
administrative system of direct public control.”139 
First, consider direct forms of imposing personal liability. 
A. Imposing Corporate Governance Liability 
As previously discussed,140 corporate risk-taking can impact the public in 
addition to impacting investors.141 To the extent needed to avoid public 
harm,142 a firm’s managers should be required to run the firm as agents not 
 
 135 Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 95, 126–29 (2004).  
 136 For example, the OTS’s regulatory action against Kaye Scholer in response to the Lincoln Saving & 
Loan Association crisis illustrates how a government entity may abuse retroactive law to alleviate political 
pressure imposed by the public and the media. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal 
Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2005).  
 137 This Article argues, for example, that corporate governance law should be reformulated to include the 
impact of systemic harm on the public. Contrary to traditional corporate governance law, which uses privately 
enforced rights in the form of shareholder derivative suits to subject managers to personal liability for 
engaging in excessive risk-taking that harms shareholders, see supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text, 
shareholders would have no interest in imposing liability on managers of their firm for externalizing systemic 
harm onto the public. I therefore propose that the government have direct authority to impose personal liability 
on managers for engaging in excessive risk-taking that causes systemic harm. See infra Part III.A.  
 138 For example, this Article argues for narrowing the limited liability protection of certain shareholding 
corporate managers, which would expose them to more of their firm’s liabilities and thereby reduce their 
incentive to cause the firm to take highly risky actions. See infra notes 231–41 and accompanying text. 
 139 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 13.1, at 383 (6th ed. 2003).  
 140 See supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text. 
 141 Cf. RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 73, 270 (2003) (arguing that legal 
reasoning may not exist as an independent concept and that consequences are what really matter). 
 142 I am separately examining the extent to which the “public governance duty” discussed above should 
supplement, or substitute for, other ways of regulating control of excessive corporate risk-taking. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Series No. 2015-40, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375. The discussion in Part III.A assumes that such a 
duty should at least supplement those other ways of regulating control. 
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only for the investors but also for the public.143 To that extent, managers 
should not only have a private corporate governance duty to investors but also 
a public corporate governance duty to society (public governance duty) not to 
engage in excessive risk-taking. Managers who breach this public governance 
duty should then be—just as managers who breach their private governance 
duty to investors already are144—subject to personal liability for breach of their 
principal-agent relationship: it “makes sense to penalize [managers] for 
causing their firms to engage in” risk-taking that would benefit the firm’s 
investors but harm the greater society.145 
This reformulation of corporate governance law raises several practical 
questions about how a firm’s managers should perform their public governance 
duty: (1) How should managers assess the potential impact on the public of 
corporate risk-taking? (2) How should managers balance public costs and 
private benefits when deciding whether the firm should engage in a given risk-
taking activity? and (3) Who should actually sue to impose personal liability 
on managers who breach their public governance duty by engaging their firms 
in excessive risk-taking? Crucially, the answer to question (2) will implicitly 
drive what excessive corporate risk-taking should mean: risk-taking that 
exceeds that balance.146 
 
 143 Cf. Miller, supra note 30, at 117–18 (observing that, in order to internalize systemic externalities, “it 
can be entirely proper—indeed economically efficient—for government to regulate . . . activities [causing such 
externalities], perhaps even to prohibit them”).  
 144 Cf. supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder derivative suits). 
 145 Miller, supra note 30, at 119. This Article does not analyze whether any such government regulation 
should be federal or state. In the United States, corporate governance has been traditionally regulated by states. 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987) (“No principle of corporation law and practice is 
more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations.”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 
U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (stating that the “first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate directors 
is in the relevant state’s corporation law”); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of 
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where 
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will 
govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”). Nonetheless, the Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Acts set 
precedents for “the federal government [to] step in if regulators believe that state law is lacking in its 
regulation of corporate governance.” Hurt, supra note 22, at 289. Federal regulation might be needed, for 
example, to overcome a collective action problem that individual state regulation could drive firms to organize 
or reorganize in other states. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 59, at 6 (discussing a flight-of-capital argument under 
corporation law that is stricter in some states than other states). This Article also does not analyze how 
directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance, which indemnifies managers against personal liability, might 
compromise the deterrent effect of imposing personal liability. Any regulatory framework for imposing such 
liability should take into account how that insurance coverage should be written to optimally balance 
managerial and public protection.  
 146 Cf. supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (observing that, traditionally, “excessive” risk-taking 
was implicitly defined by its potential impact on the firm’s investors). 
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Consider these questions in turn. 
1. How Should Managers Assess the Potential Impact on the Public of 
Corporate Risk-Taking? 
As with any other type of corporate action, it is difficult, ex ante, to 
precisely predict ex post consequences. That difficulty would likely be even 
greater when predicting consequences to the public, not merely to the firm and 
its investors. 
In the traditional corporate governance context, managerial decisions—
including risk-taking decisions147—are protected to some extent by the 
business judgment rule, which presumes that managers should not be 
personally liable for harm caused by negligent decisions made in good faith 
and without conflicts of interest—and in some articulations of the business 
judgment rule, also without gross negligence.148 On its face, at least, the 
business judgment rule should apply to managers trying to predict 
consequences of corporate risk-taking to the public.149 But, given those public 
consequences, should the business judgment rule be modified to make it easier 
to impose personal liability for excessive risk-taking that causes systemic 
harm?150 
In a traditional context (i.e., without regard to systemic risk), at least two 
scholars have considered and rejected arguments to weaken the business 
judgment rule for excessive risk-taking. Professor Hurt has rejected any such 
weakening of the rule as imprudent and, insofar as the exercise of managerial 
 
 147 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 10:5, Westlaw (database updated December 2014) 
(arguing that a board may be compelled to make a decision without having all the relevant facts, but the 
business judgment rule should protect the board from liability for this risky decision); cf. Miller, supra note 30, 
at 48, 103–09 (arguing that corporate risk-taking decisions “are always business decisions”). 
 148 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Hurt, supra note 22, at 258. Although the 
precise formulation of the business judgment rule depends on the relevant jurisdiction applying it, the 
formulation in the text above is widely accepted. 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1036 (Supp. 2014–2015); cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 96 
(2d ed. 2009) (observing that “the one thing about the business judgment rule on which everyone agrees is that 
it insulates directors from liability for negligence”). 
 149 Cf. Miller, supra note 30, at 109 (arguing that “[i]f there are cogent reasons for having a business 
judgment rule, those reasons should foreclose any substantive review by courts of a firm’s risk-management 
practices”). Although Professor Miller references “risk-management” decisions, not risk-taking decisions, he 
does not appear to intend to draw a distinction. Id. 
 150 That would also respond, at least indirectly, to the impediment that prosecutorial risk-reward 
assessment is tightening under shrinking resources. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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business judgment is inappropriate for court review, unmanageable.151 She also 
has said that it would be inconsistent with corporate law principles to impose 
personal liability for poor managerial judgment.152 It should be up to 
shareholders, she has argued, to evaluate corporate risk through their 
investment decisions, not through litigation.153 Professor Miller has adopted 
similar arguments in rejecting any such weakening of the business judgment 
rule.154 
To the extent those arguments assume that shareholders evaluate risk 
through their investment decisions, the arguments are irrelevant to the question 
of imposing personal liability for excessive risk-taking that causes public harm. 
As discussed, a firm’s shareholders would have no incentive—and thus are 
highly unlikely no matter what the liability standard—to sue managers for 
engaging in excessively systemically risky actions.155 To the contrary, 
shareholders generally want their firms to take potentially profitable risks, 
regardless of the possible systemic impact.156 
Nonetheless, the inappropriate-for-court-review part of those arguments 
should have merit no matter who, a shareholder or a government prosecutor, is 
attempting to impose personal liability. It generally would be impractical for a 
judge, who typically lacks business experience, to review business 
management decisions. Even if the decisions result in risk-taking that causes 
public harm, Professor Miller argues that judicial review might require the 
court not only to “exercis[e] business judgment, but also [to] exercis[e] it on a 
scale wide enough to encompass the entire risk-return profile of the company, 
and deep enough to reach virtually every investment or trade the company 
makes.”157 
For two reasons, however, I believe that the public interest requires some 
weakening of the business judgment rule. Members of the public, unlike 
shareholders, cannot mitigate their harm by voting to replace managers or 
 
 151 See Hurt, supra note 22, at 259–60. 
 152 Id. at 258–60. 
 153 Id. at 264–65. 
 154 Miller, supra note 30, at 120–23 (looking at financial models used by risk managers and noting that 
they incorporate business judgments in selection of historical data to predict the future in an effort to smooth 
returns, which should be a business decision and not reviewable by the courts). 
 155 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 157 Miller, supra note 30, at 109. Although beyond the scope of this Article, policymakers might consider 
whether certain categories of corporate risk-taking actions are so systemically risky that they should be 
prohibited outright. 
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selling stock. Even more significantly, public harm breaches one of the basic 
assumptions of the business judgment rule’s application—that there be no 
conflict of interest.158 The interest of a manager who holds significant shares or 
interests in shares,159 or whose compensation or retention is dependent on 
share price, is aligned with the interest of the firm’s shareholders, not with that 
of the public. To that extent, the manager would have a conflict of interest. I 
recognize that courts applying the business judgment rule usually look for 
conflicts of interest between managers, on the one hand, and the firm and its 
shareholders, on the other hand.160 Logically, however, if—as this Article 
argues—the managers should also have a duty to the public, then the notion of 
conflicts should be broadened to include conflicts between managers, on the 
one hand, and the public, on the other hand. 
Managers who are conflicted in that way should not be given quite the 
same absolute deference that the business judgment rule gives non-conflicted 
managers. One response, for example, would be to remove that deference if 
conflicted managers are grossly negligent in assessing harm to the public.161 
That would technically not change the business judgment rule; it would merely 
apply the gross negligence standard that is articulated as part of that rule,162 
though rarely utilized with any rigor.163 
 
 158 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
 159 This could include stock options, for example. 
 160 Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep 
the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 31 n.202 (“Of course, deference, in the form of the 
business judgment rule, is given to management decisions in the absence of a conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders.” (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).  
 161 Any such gross negligence should be judged, of course, ex ante. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 
(2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate 
corporate business decisions. . . . [A] reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years 
later against a background of perfect knowledge.”).  
 162 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 163 Although gross negligence is articulated as part of the business judgment rule, directors usually are not 
subjected to monetary damages for violating their duty of care, even when they are grossly negligent. See, e.g., 
Carter G. Bishop, Directorial Abdication and the Taxonomic Role of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Law, 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 905, 911; Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards 
and Antitrust Compliance, 58 S.D. L. REV. 499, 502 (2013) (observing that although it is included in the duty 
of care, gross negligence “has almost no place in the life of a board member of a public company because 
every state of the Union has enacted so-called ‘exculpation’ enabling laws that permit corporations to excuse 
their boards of any duty of care”). 
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Under that standard, the failure to use even slight care could justify 
imposing liability.164 Thus, a “pure heart and empty head” assessment of 
potential systemic consequences of corporate risk-taking would be insufficient 
to merit a business-judgment-rule defense. Because courts routinely review 
whether other types of actions are grossly negligent,165 they should not find it 
“inappropriate”166 or “impractical”167 to review corporate risk-taking actions 
under that standard. Moreover, as a practical matter, managers who follow a 
reasonable procedure to balance public costs and private benefits—perhaps one 
akin to the procedure next discussed—should be protected. That would 
effectively conform the business judgment rule’s application to a duty of 
process care, the standard commonly used in the United States.168 
2. How Should Managers Balance Public Costs and Private Benefits When 
Deciding Whether the Firm Should Engage in a Given Risk-Taking 
Activity? 
I have considered a somewhat parallel question in the context of examining 
how managers of a firm in the “vicinity of insolvency”—who then run the firm 
as agents not only for the shareholders but also for the creditors—should 
balance their ex ante assessment of costs to creditors and benefits to 
shareholders when deciding whether the firm should engage in a given 
risk-taking activity.169 In that context, I argued that no algorithm can dictate 
the balance because “balancing benefit to shareholders with harm to creditors 
is like balancing ‘apples and oranges’—they are not comparable 
commodities.”170 
In order to “more directly address th[is] non-comparable nature,” managers 
should have “latitude to make their own good faith weighing of benefit and 
 
 164 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding that the board of directors 
failed to exercise due care in evaluating and recommending a merger for shareholder approval), overruled on 
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 165 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Judge’s Ruling on Gulf Oil Spill Lowers Ceiling on the Fine BP Is Facing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/energy-environment/judge-sets-top-
penalty-for-bp-in-deepwater-horizon-spill-at-nearly-14-billion.html (observing that Judge Carl J. Barbier of 
the Federal District Court in New Orleans found BP grossly negligent in causing the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill).  
 166 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 167 Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text (raising the objection that penalizing managers for poor 
judgment would be inappropriate and impractical for court review). 
 168 Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 47. 
 169 Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 673–77.  
 170 Id. at 675.  
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harm, recognizing that harm to creditors may well be more significant [in the 
insolvency context] than benefit to shareholders.”171 To that end, I proposed 
that “where non-comparable commodities of benefit and harm to different 
parties are being weighed, the benefit may have to considerably outweigh the 
harm, or at least provide a compelling case, to be justified.”172 
The same type of approach could be applied to corporate risk-taking that 
could, because it entails systemic risk, harm the public. Indeed, the 
“considerably outweigh” requirement implicitly adopts what Professor Cass 
Sunstein calls a “fourth form” of the precautionary principle to protect the 
public.173 It does not merely shift to the firm’s managers the burden to prove 
that the risk-taking activity should be permitted; it also increases the burden by 
adding a safety margin.174 
Excessive corporate risk-taking therefore should mean, from the standpoint 
of systemic risk, risk-taking for which the private benefits to investors are not 
expected to considerably outweigh any systemic costs to the public.175 
Managers who engage systemically important firms in such risk-taking would 
have violated their public governance duty and thus should be subject to 
personal liability. Such managers nonetheless should be protected by the 
business judgment rule if they acted in good faith and without gross negligence 
but, nonetheless, incorrectly assessed the potential harm of the risk-taking to 
the public or the balancing of that harm with the expected benefit of the 
risk-taking to investors. 
One may ask why a normative analysis should ever weigh costs and 
benefits to different parties—in our case, a firm’s investors and the public. At 
least one answer is that public policymaking routinely relies on the Kaldor–
Hicks concept of efficiency, under which a public project is regarded as 
efficient if its overall benefits exceed its overall costs regardless of who bears 
the costs and who gets the benefits.176 Admittedly, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency 
 
 171 Id. at 675. 
 172 Id. at 676–77. 
 173 Cf. supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text (discussing the application of a precautionary principle 
to this Article’s cost–benefit analysis). 
 174 See supra note 124. 
 175 For expected value examples of that weighing of costs and benefits, see Schwarcz, supra note 142. 
 176 POSNER, supra note 139, § 1.2, at 13. I realize that this Article is making a normative claim based on a 
factual observation, but norms generally are, and should be, tethered to reality. ISAIAH BERLIN, PERSONAL 
IMPRESSIONS xxi (Henry Hardy ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001) (1981); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New 
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1988) (grafting a normative 
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implicitly assumes that the distribution of benefits and costs is not controlled 
by the party—in our case, a firm’s managers—also controlling the decision 
whether to engage in the project.177 But those managers do not completely 
control the distribution of benefits; the public usually benefits, at least 
indirectly, from corporate risk-taking that benefits investors.178 
3. Who Should Actually Sue to Impose Personal Liability on Managers 
Who Breach Their Public Governance Duty? 
If, as this Article has argued, managers should be subject to liability for 
breaching their public governance duty by engaging in excessive systemic 
risk-taking, how should that liability be imposed? Under existing corporate 
governance law, shareholder derivative suits are the primary means to impose 
liability on managers. Shareholders would have no interest, however, in 
imposing liability on managers of their firm for externalizing systemic harm.179 
 
analysis onto a positive assumption, in this case taking the existence of corporate reorganizations in 
bankruptcy law as a given to put forth a suggestion to improve the reorganization process). 
 177 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT 190–91 (2004). Kaldor–Hicks efficiency aims to 
maximize society’s aggregate utility. Id. Legal reasoning concerning non-voluntary or non-consensual 
transactions employs the Kaldor–Hicks test as a hypothetical efficiency standard in considering “what rules 
and institutional mechanisms might best advance social welfare.” Id. at 191. Additionally, when “a right is 
protected by a liability rule it is subject to a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency analysis and can be subject to a forced 
exchange if social utility can be enhanced.” Id. 
 178 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
38 (1991); Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651, 705–07 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra, at 35–39). The traditional law 
and economics view of the shareholder-value-maximization rule as “efficient and workable” relies on the 
rule’s ability to take “advantage of the firm’s strength due to its tendency to maximize wealth in general.” Id. 
at 706. Under the shareholder-value-maximization rule, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel believe that 
the firm can maximize wealth in general for two primary reasons. First, the managers work in the interests of 
the shareholders alone (without regard for the benefit or harm to the public), which keeps agency costs lower, 
thus allowing social wealth to rise. Second, the focus on maximizing the firm’s residual value helps the other 
“constituencies” automatically: “In a market economy each party to a transaction is better off.” Id.; see also 
Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2063, 2065 (2001) (explaining that under the utilitarian approach, the shareholder-value-maximization rule 
increases overall fairness and wealth because it provides managers with an easy-to-follow metric that views 
the shareholders as the firm’s residual beneficiaries, and it benefits employees and other stakeholders through 
producing fluid and efficient capital markets while still giving them the option to contract with the corporation 
for what they want). Moreover, the “considerably outweigh” requirement provides a margin of safety to 
protect the public. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 179 And because any such harm would not be to the firm, any lawsuit by shareholders would not even be a 
“derivative” suit. 
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Therefore, the government, by default, at least should have the right to impose 
that liability.180 
Another option is the use of private lawsuits, where citizens sue on behalf 
of the government in order to remedy a public harm. As Professor David 
Engstrom notes, “One of the most significant developments in the American 
regulatory state in recent decades is a marked shift away from administrative 
regulation and enforcement and toward the use of private lawsuits to regulate 
social and economic behavior.”181 Within the context of this Article, private 
lawsuits would seek to impose personal liability on managers for engaging in 
excessive systemic risk-taking. The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act 
(FCA)182 provide a helpful precedent for how these private lawsuits might 
work. 
The FCA creates liability for any person who defrauds the U.S. 
government.183 Although the Department of Justice can initiate the action,184 
“most [of the] FCA enforcement efforts are initiated as private lawsuits 
brought pursuant to the FCA’s qui tam provisions.”185 These provisions 
authorize private citizens to sue alleged defrauders in the name of the United 
States.186 If the suit is successful or settled, the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to 
thirty percent of the award or settlement, plus costs and attorneys’ fees.187 
 
 180 The government might also consider experimenting with DPAs as a means to refocus corporate 
governance towards this Article’s public governance duty. Cf. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 96, at 55 (“DPA-
related business changes, board changes, and cooperation requirements could over time have a substantive 
impact on corporate governance.”). That assumes, however, that DPAs are used in the future to try to deter 
excessive risk-taking that is not illegal; heretofore, they have been used only to deter crime and other illegal 
actions. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 181 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation,  
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1919 (2014). 
 182 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
 183 Engstrom, supra note 181, at 1943. 
 184 Id. at 1944. 
 185 Id. (italics added). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(d)); see also Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 381–85; cf. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk 
Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993 (2010) (arguing that the qui tam litigation model could be used to help 
enforce regulations meant to reduce systemic risk). Although D&O liability insurance will be needed to 
incentivize good managers and also to help ensure that sufficient funds are available to properly incentivize 
private-action lawsuits, see supra note 145, such insurance can undermine incentives. Managers protected by 
D&O insurance would be more willing to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Richard MacMinn, Yayuan 
Ren & Li-Ming Han, Directors, Directors and Officers Insurance, and Corporate Governance, 35 J. INS. 
ISSUES 159, 165 (2012) (observing that “[t]he major criticism of corporate purchase of D&O insurance is that 
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Even though the citizen-plaintiff “suffers no injury” and thus would appear 
to “lack the ‘injury in fact’ required to create Article III standing” under the 
U.S. Constitution,188 the Supreme Court has found standing through a 
somewhat circular argument: the Act’s partial assignment of the government’s 
claim to the citizen-plaintiff provides a sufficient stake in the outcome to create 
Article III standing.189 That same argument could justify standing in this 
Article’s context. Indeed, citizen-plaintiffs would have an additional standing 
claim: as members of the public, they would be directly harmed by a 
systemically important firm’s collapse.190 
B. Clawing Back Compensation 
This approach to imposing personal liability would respond to the 
impediment that decision-making is becoming more decentralized.191 If firms 
themselves set how managerial compensation should be clawed back, that 
would enlist the firm to help allocate losses to individual managers, 
notwithstanding decentralized decision-making. This approach should help to 
more rationally balance risk-taking, as described in the cost–benefit analysis 
below. 
First consider how clawing back compensation could work. Professor 
Coffee has proposed a remedy of “mandatory clawbacks,” requiring incentive 
compensation (e.g., bonuses) to be forfeited by “Senior Financial Executives” 
for periods in which the SEC finds “substantial noncompliance with securities 
laws—without regard to individual fault.”192 I have more broadly proposed 
 
it creates moral hazard problems for” the managers covered by such insurance). A possible solution might be 
to increase the size of the deductible for actions that result in systemic harm.  
 188 Bales, supra note 187, at 384 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). 
 189 Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2000)). 
 190 That additional standing claim might be subject to a “prudential” limitation to standing—that a 
citizen-plaintiff’s injury should not be merely “a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in equal measure by all or a 
large class of citizens.” Id. at 397 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). But Congress may, by 
statute, waive that prudential limitation. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Bales, supra note 187, at 398. 
 191 See supra Part I.A.2. By effectively privatizing enforcement, this approach to imposing personal 
liability would also respond, at least indirectly, to the impediment that the shrinking of resources is tightening 
prosecutorial risk–reward assessment. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 192 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012) (authorizing the SEC to enforce the 
recovery of bonuses paid to CEOs and CFOs of public companies when the company issues financial 
restatements due to material noncompliance “with any financial reporting requirement under the securities 
laws” resulting from misconduct); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1382 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4) (improving Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
of 2002, Section 304 by designating a firm’s board of directors, rather than the SEC, as the enforcer of 
clawbacks and removing a misconduct prerequisite for clawbacks); Jesse D. Gossett, Financial Institution 
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requiring compensation clawbacks for secondary managers of financial firms 
who act in conflict with their firms’ long-term interests.193 At least one major 
investment bank, Morgan Stanley, has effectively implemented both proposals 
by providing, for all of its bonus-eligible employees, that cash bonuses are 
“subject to a clawback provision that could be triggered if the individual 
engages in conduct detrimental to the Firm.”194 And DPAs themselves—even 
though primarily firm-level remedies195—could require firms to agree to claw 
back compensation paid to employees who engage in specified prohibited 
conduct.196 
From a cost–benefit standpoint, clawing back compensation could create 
significant benefits by aligning the economic incentives of firms, their 
managers, and society.197 If a firm fails or performs poorly, its managers could 
be forced to repay a portion of their compensation. Penalizing unsuccessful 
risk-taking in this way would motivate managers to run their firms more 
prudently. That, in turn, would help to minimize failures of firms; and if the 
clawback is applied to systemically important firms,198 it would help to reduce 
systemic risk. The benefits therefore could be significant. 
And the costs are likely to be small. Even though clawing back 
compensation could reduce risk-taking, that should not undermine economic 
progress. Competitive pressures should still motivate managers to engage in 
 
Executive Compensation: The Problem of Financially Motivated Excess Risk-Taking, the Regulatory 
Response, and Common Sense Solutions, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 51, 63 (2013) (“Despite these subtle 
differences, the intent of both laws is the same: To hold those in charge of a publicly traded corporation 
responsible when they profit from inaccurate or fraudulent financial reporting. As will be shown, this will do 
nothing to actually reduce the level of systemic risk at financial institutions which means this provision will be 
largely ineffective at holding off the next financial crisis.”).  
 193 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management 
Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 465–66 (2009).  
 194 Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive 
Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 389 (2009) (quoting Morgan Stanley 
Executives Forgo Bonuses, as Program Is Changed, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 8, 2008, 3:31 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/morgan-stanley-executives-forego-bonuses-as-program-is-changed.  
 195 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 196 Cf. Arlen, supra note 99, at 152–53 (observing that DPAs create “prosecutorial authority to engage in 
firm-specific regulation of corporate practices relating to deterring and investigating corporate crime”). Thus, 
DPAs could be used to require a firm to identify and, by reducing their compensation or firing them, to punish 
such wrongdoing individuals. 
 197 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010) 
(arguing that bank compensation structures have provided executives with the incentive to take excessive 
risks). 
 198 Cf. infra note 199 and accompanying text (proposing regulation mandating that all systemically 
important firms adopt clawback managerial compensation). 
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the risk-taking needed to keep their firms profitable. A potential real cost could 
result, however, from a collective action problem: firms that institute clawback 
compensation schemes could find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in 
hiring good managers. That problem could be solved, and that cost could 
thereby be mitigated, by regulation mandating that all systemically important 
firms adopt clawback managerial compensation.199 
C. Imposing Ex Post Facto (Civil) Liability 
This approach to imposing personal liability would respond to the 
impediment that the law increasingly lags financial innovation.200 It thus 
addresses the dilemma that excessive risk-taking may violate norms but not 
law.201 
Although ex post facto criminal liability is unconstitutional in the United 
States, ex post facto civil liability is not.202 Implicitly, tort law already operates 
as a mechanism for imposing ex post facto civil liability to internalize 
externalities: “For example, in applying tort law’s ‘reasonably prudent person’ 
standard of care in negligence actions, a jury ‘determines what the expected 
level of conduct in the community should be.’”203 To that end, jurors “must 
draw on their own understanding of reasonable behavior, based on their 
experience of the world.”204 “Because the jury is effectively defining the 
community norm at the trial stage and not necessarily at the time of the alleged 
tort, civil liability is sometimes imposed based on ex post norms.”205 
Imposing personal liability on an ex post facto basis could therefore be 
beneficial by reducing the time lag between norms and law. Nonetheless, its 
impact on economic progress could be very costly. Corporate managers could 
not know, at the time of their actions, whether engaging in a particular 
 
 199 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 193, at 468–69 (observing that government regulation may well be the 
best way to resolve the collective-action problem that deferred or contingent compensation schemes can 
competitively disadvantage firms individually implementing those schemes); cf. supra note 40 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the government is attempting to identify systemically important firms). 
 200 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 201 See Schwarcz, supra note 136, at 36–42. 
 202 See Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom-to-Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE L.J. 767, 792 (2012), 
and sources cited therein.  
 203 Id. (quoting JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 
47 (4th ed. 2010)). 
 204 Id. at 793 (quoting Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 654 (2003)).  
 205 Id. at 793–94 (footnote omitted). 
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risk-taking activity would later subject them to personal liability. Therefore, 
they would have a strong incentive to engage in low-risk activities, thereby 
potentially making their firms less innovative and competitive.206 On balance, 
the benefits of imposing personal liability on an ex post facto basis do not 
appear to outweigh the costs. 
D. Reassigning Corporate Responsibility 
This approach to imposing personal liability would respond to the 
impediment that decision-making is becoming more decentralized.207 In the 
context of risk-taking managers, this might be done in several ways. Former 
Attorney General Holder has suggested, for example, that managers should be 
specifically designated in advance to bear personal responsibility for their 
firm’s excessively risky activities.208 There also has been discussion of making 
senior managers responsible for their subordinates’ actions under a “failure to 
supervise” theory.209 That would have an analogous precedent as the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s “responsible corporate officer doctrine,” under 
which supervisory managers could be held liable for illegal activities that they 
were in a position to prevent.210 In an even more radical approach, the United 
 
 206 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 208 Remarks of Attorney General Eric Holder, supra note 18 (observing that this is “the same principle 
behind the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that a designated company executive must sign its accounting forms 
and bear liability for misrepresentations”).  
 209 See Todd S. Fishman & Brian de Haan, Lessons from the Credit Crisis: A Subtle Shift in the Long 
Reach for Top Executives, 17 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELECTRONIC AGE, Dec. 2013, at 9. 
 210 Remarks of Attorney General Eric Holder, supra note 18. The Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) 
doctrine  
does not require the government to pierce the corporate veil or show that the officer personally 
perpetrated or otherwise participated in the wrongful act. If the government proves that the 
defendant was a corporate officer who failed to use his or her authority to assure that the 
corporation complied with laws and regulations, the government may hold the defendant 
individually responsible under the RCO doctrine as an alternative theory of liability.  
Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible Corporate Officer 
Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288 (2002). 
Similarly, the “failure to supervise” theory “merely requires a showing that the senior executive possesses the 
‘power to control’ the violator and, if such control can be shown, mere negligence as to whether the violator 
was adequately supervised.” Fishman & de Haan, supra note 209. Thus, under these and similar theories of 
liability, there appears to be no requirement to show that the executive participated in the underlying act; all 
that is required is a showing that the person was a corporate officer (under the RCO doctrine) or possessed 
power to control (under the “failure to supervise” theory), and failed to assure that the corporation complied 
with the laws and regulations (under the RCO doctrine) or was negligent in the supervision of its subordinates 
(under the “failure to supervise” theory). 
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Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England’s regulatory 
arm, the Prudential Regulation Authority, have proposed regulations that 
would reverse the burden of proof, requiring bankers of a failed bank to prove 
that they acted appropriately in order to avoid personal criminal liability.211 
From a cost–benefit standpoint, the benefits of reassigning corporate 
responsibility should be significant. The increasingly decentralized nature of 
decision-making at firms makes it difficult to impose personal liability,212 
which gives little incentive for risk-taking managers to change their 
behavior.213 Yet excessive risk-taking has been identified as one of the primary 
causes of the financial crisis.214 Reassigning corporate responsibility would 
make it easier to impose personal liability for engaging in—which in turn 
would help to discourage—excessive risk-taking. 
Reassigning corporate responsibility would have costs, however, limiting at 
least some of the benefits of decentralized decision-making. Recall that those 
benefits include encouraging motivation and creativity, allowing many minds 
to work simultaneously on the same problem, and accommodating flexibility 
and individualization.215 Designating a manager to bear ultimate responsibility 
should certainly not prevent many minds from being able to work 
simultaneously on the same problem. Nor should it discourage employees from 
offering flexibility in ideas. In practice, however, it could—and indeed, 
depending on the methods and the penalty imposed, other forms of reassigning 
corporate responsibility would—motivate managers to be risk-averse,216 which 
 
 211 Jill Treanor, Regulators Want Reckless Bankers to Be Criminally Liable Under New Plans, GUARDIAN 
(July 30, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/30/regulators-want-bankers-to-
accept-criminal-liability.  
 212 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; cf. Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking 
Oversight Liability Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 200–01 (2010) (observing 
that following the financial crisis, many regulators and investors were left wondering the same question: who 
is in charge and who is to blame?). 
 213 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 214 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 215 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 216 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive 
Perspective on Risk Taking, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 401 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000). 
Perhaps the most important cause of risk aversion is loss aversion, the discrepancy between 
the weights that are attached to losses and to gains in evaluating prospects. Loss aversion is not 
mitigated when decisions are made in an organizational context. On the contrary, the asymmetry 
between credit and blame may enhance the asymmetry between gains and losses in the decision 
maker’s utilities. The evidence indicates that the pressures of accountability and personal 
responsibility increase the status quo bias and other manifestations of loss aversion. Decision 
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in turn could undermine motivation and creativity. Furthermore, it might 
discourage the best people from wanting to be managers.217 For example, in 
protest of the proposed United Kingdom regulations,218 it was reported that 
two directors from HSBC’s United Kingdom branch threatened to quit.219 
Reassigning corporate responsibility would thus have the benefit of helping 
to discourage excessive risk-taking, but, depending on how it works and the 
penalty imposed, could have the costs of undermining motivation and 
creativity and discouraging quality management. To minimize those costs, it is 
important that the reassignment and penalty be reasonable.220 One such 
approach might be regulation requiring systemically important firms to 
specifically designate one or more risk managers; to adopt both proactive and 
review-oriented protocols designed to identify and deter excessive risk-taking; 
and to set compensation based, among other things, on compliance with those 
protocols. This type of risk management is already common to deter excessive 
traditional risk-taking.221 Its scope should be expanded to deter excessive 
risk-taking that could have systemic consequences. 
Although the benefits of that approach would appear to exceed its costs, 
any uncertainty could be resolved by applying the semi-strong form of the 
precautionary principle—that where a cost–benefit analysis of regulation 
yields an uncertain result, the presumption should be in favor of the 
 
makers become more risk averse when they expect their choices to be reviewed by others and 
they are extremely reluctant to accept responsibility for even a small increase in the probability of 
a disaster. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 217 Cf. Sean Farrell, HSBC Directors to Quit Over Threat to Jail Bosses for Banking Crises, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 7, 2014, 10:36 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/07/hsbc-directors-quit-jail-bank-
crises (reporting that two HSBC directors threatened to quit in protest of proposed United Kingdom 
regulations subjecting bankers of a failed bank to criminal liability unless they could prove that they acted 
appropriately). 
 218 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.  
 219 Farrell, supra note 217. 
 220 In contrast, I view the proposed United Kingdom regulation, see supra note 211 and accompanying 
text, as unreasonable both in its reversal of the burden of proof, which comes close to imposing strict liability, 
and in its criminal penalty.  
 221 See, e.g., SCOTT BARET ET AL., DELOITTE, DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE OPERATING 
MODEL: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARDS AND MANAGEMENT TEAMS 1 (2013), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/governance-risk-compliance/lu-developing-
effective-governance-operating-model-03032015.pdf (observing that many boards have voluntarily appointed 
chief risk officers (CROs) in order to bolster the effectiveness of their companies’ governance). Foreign 
jurisdictions are also increasingly requiring the appointment of CROs. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/risk-
management-corporate-governance.pdf.  
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regulation.222 In this case, the presumption would be in favor of regulation 
reassigning corporate responsibility—again, assuming the reassignment and 
the penalty are reasonable. 
Next, consider indirectly imposing liability by modifying legal protections 
that have impeded the ability of market participants themselves to control 
excessive risk-taking. 
E. Narrowing Limited Liability 
Narrowing limited liability for at least certain firm managers can limit 
conflicts that encourage excessive risk-taking. This approach to imposing 
personal liability would, directly or indirectly, respond to several of the 
impediments. It would directly respond by privatizing the imposition of 
liability, thereby avoiding prosecutorial costs. It would indirectly respond by 
better aligning the benefits and burdens of corporate risk-taking with the 
incentives of the firm’s managers.223 
Corporate limited liability protects a firm’s equity investors from the firm’s 
liabilities, except for the capital invested.224 Historically, the legislative trend 
towards limited liability was heavily influenced by corporate lobbying.225 In 
the United States, that trend was further “influenced . . . by fear of capital flight 
to other states.”226 “The judicial progression towards limited liability also had a 
‘fairness’ rationale: to protect innocent shareholders who are not in a ‘capacity 
to control’ or influence management decisions.”227 And although limited 
liability can create moral hazard, leading to excessive corporate risk-taking that 
was seen as potentially harmful to investors, it also encourages equity-capital 
investment by addressing investor risk aversion. Empirically, scholars are 
uncertain how those factors should be balanced.228 
 
 222 See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 223 As will be shown, the managers that should be subjected to personal liability by narrowing limited 
liability are those who can directly profit by the corporate risk-taking. Infra notes 232–34 and accompanying 
text. Hence, Holder’s observation most directly applies, that if managers “enjoy all of the rewards of 
excessively-risky activity while bearing none of the responsibility,” it inevitably will lead to excessive risk-
taking. Holder, supra note 18. 
 224 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1984); id. § 6.22 cmt. (“Section 6.22(b) sets forth the 
basic rule of non-liability of shareholders for corporate acts or debts that underlies modern corporation law.”).  
 225 Schwarcz, supra note 59, at 8.  
 226 Id. at 8. 
 227 Id. at 9. 
 228 Id. at 13. 
SCHWARCZ GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/14/2016 2:36 PM 
576 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:533 
That balance shifts radically, however, in the context of shadow banking. 
Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to the decentralized provision of 
financing outside of traditional banking channels, and thus without the need for 
traditional modes of bank intermediation between capital markets and the users 
of funds.229 The shadow-banking system is immense, most recently estimated 
at $67 trillion worldwide.230 Numerous types of firms make up the 
shadow-banking system, including special purpose entities (SPEs) used in 
securitization and structured finance transactions to raise financing indirectly 
through the capital markets as well as finance companies, hedge funds, private 
equity firms, money-market mutual funds, non-bank government-sponsored 
enterprises, securities lenders, and investment banks.231 
For at least two reasons, limited liability can be a uniquely fertile source of 
systemic externalities for shadow-banking firms. First, managers of 
shadow-banking firms are likely to take greater risks than managers of other 
limited liability firms. 
The relatively small firms, such as hedge funds, that operate in the 
shadow banking system are often managed directly by their primary 
investors. Because such investor-managers typically are entitled to a 
significant share of their firm’s profits, they have strong incentives to 
take [high] risks that could generate [outsized] profits.232 
Yet if a risky action exposes their firm to significant liability for externalized 
harm, limited liability protects those investor-managers from losing more than 
their invested capital. “This is radically unlike the management incentives in 
non-shadow banking firms. . . . [in which] senior managers tend to share only 
indirectly in profits, such as through stock options.”233 Furthermore, managers 
 
 229 See FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING THE OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING 1 
(2012), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120420c.pdf (describing the shadow-banking 
system as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system”). Shadow 
banking is sometimes alternatively defined as the provision of financing by any type of financial intermediary 
that operates without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees. TOBIAS ADRIAN & 
ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING REGULATION 5 (2012).  
 230 FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 8 (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www. 
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating shadow banking’s worldwide assets in 
2011); cf. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING 4–5 (2010), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (arguing that shadow bank financing appears to 
dwarf traditional bank financing). 
 231 Schwarcz, supra note 59, at 2. 
 232 Id. at 18. 
 233 Id. at 19. 
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of non-shadow banking firms are often more invested in maintaining their jobs 
and thus less motivated to take actions that risk the firm.234 
Even more significantly, the failure of a shadow-banking firm is more 
likely than that of a non-bank to have systemic consequences. Like traditional 
banks, shadow-banking firms engage in financial intermediation on which the 
real economy is dependent. “Because all financial intermediaries—including 
shadow-banking firms and traditional banks—tend to be highly interconnected, 
the failure of a shadow-banking firm could trigger the failures of other 
financial intermediaries.”235 “Such a chain of failures would be the epitome of 
a systemic event, especially if it materially reduced the availability of financial 
intermediation.”236 Additionally, shadow banking’s reliance on short-term 
funding of long-term projects not only increases the likelihood of a 
shadow-banking firm’s failure but also can increase the systemic consequences 
of that failure. “Economists have identified the failure of shadow banking 
firms to roll over short-term debt as a contributing factor to the [recent] 
financial crisis.”237 
A potential solution to this problem is to impose personal liability on 
investor-managers with the power to “control” shadow-banking firms by 
narrowing their limited liability protection—perhaps to double liability or 
some other multiple of their investment.238 From a cost–benefit standpoint, that 
would more closely align the benefits and burdens of risk-taking to those firms 
and managers. This solution would also indirectly respond to the impediment 
that systemic harm limits proof of causation.239 By reducing the incentive for 
managers of shadow-banking firms to engage in actions that could cause their 
firms to fail, that narrowing of limited liability protection would reduce the 
systemic harm that could result from such failures. 
The cost of this solution would likely be small. It would not be unfair to 
shareholders because it would only impact those in a capacity to control the 
firm. And, for two reasons, the solution should not unduly discourage 
equity-capital investment. First, even if they are risk averse,240 
 
 234 Id.  
 235 Id. at 20. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 21. 
 238 Id. at 23 (proposing that such investor-managers be subjected to double liability—i.e., liability equal to 
twice their equity investment—for their firm’s obligations). 
 239 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 240 They are more likely to be risk-prone. Schwarcz, supra note 59, at 18.  
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owner-managers with the power to control their firms could choose to govern 
to minimize their potential liability. Second, the liability of those 
owner-managers should not be open-ended but, as discussed, limited to 
double-liability (or some other multiple of their investment).241 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article begins by asking why so few financial executives have been 
held responsible for the excessive risk-taking that was a principal cause of the 
2008–2009 financial crisis and its associated banking failures. Part of the 
answer, it explains, is that impediments such as the complexity of financial 
innovation and the decentralization of managerial responsibilities are making it 
difficult for prosecutors, whose resources since 9/11 have been 
disproportionately allocated to terrorism-related cases, to win cases attempting 
to impose personal liability. Prosecutors instead have been taking the easier 
and less costly route of imposing firm-level liability.242 
But being managed by individuals, firms themselves are second-best 
targets of deterrence. This Article shows that firm-level liability may well be 
insufficient—and almost certainly will be inefficient—to deter excessive 
risk-taking and prevent another financial crisis. Managers engaging in 
excessive corporate risk-taking should therefore also be subjected to personal 
liability. To accomplish that, the law needs to overcome another, and more 
fundamental, impediment: confusion and ambiguity over what excessive 
risk-taking actually means. 
Corporate governance law already covers, and subjects managers to 
personal liability for engaging in, certain types of excessive risk-taking. But it 
does not cover the type of risk-taking that led to the financial crisis and that is 
becoming ever more common—risk-taking that could have systemic 
consequences to the financial system. This Article analyzes how personal 
liability could be used to control that type of risk-taking without undermining 
economic progress. 
Among other approaches,243 this Article argues for a “public governance 
duty”—that corporate governance law should require managers to assess the 
 
 241 See supra note 238 and accompanying text (proposing a double liability limit). 
 242 This route is easier and less costly for several reasons, including that firms are more likely to settle as a 
cost of doing business. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 243 These other approaches include clawing back compensation and possibly reassigning corporate 
responsibility. See supra Parts III.B & III.D. 
SCHWARCZ GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/14/2016 2:36 PM 
2015] EXCESSIVE CORPORATE RISK-TAKING 579 
impact of risk-taking on the public as well as on investors, and to balance the 
costs and benefits using a precautionary principle to protect the public. In 
contrast, corporate risk-taking has heretofore been assessed only by its 
potential impact on the firm’s investors, principally its risk-seeking 
shareholders, motivating firms to engage in transactions that were expected to 
be profitable even though their failure could increase systemic risk (since much 
of the harm from a resulting systemic collapse would be externalized).  
This Article also analyzes the extent to which managers performing this 
public governance duty should be protected by the business judgment rule. 
Systemic harm resulting from excessive risk-taking can create a novel conflict 
of interest, between the public interest and the interests of managers with 
significant shareholdings or stock-price-related compensation. Because the 
business judgment rule itself does not unconditionally protect conflicted 
managers, this Article argues that those managers’ risk-taking decisions should 
be subject to a gross negligence standard, which is sometimes articulated as 
part of the business judgment rule (though rarely applied). Courts routinely 
review whether other types of actions are grossly negligent, so they should not 
find it inappropriate or impractical to review corporate risk-taking actions 
under that standard. 
This Article also examines how managers who breach their public 
governance duty by engaging in excessive corporate risk-taking should be 
sued. Under traditional corporate governance law, shareholder derivative suits 
are the primary means to impose liability on managers. Investors would have 
no interest, however, in imposing liability on managers of their firm for 
externalizing systemic harm. Therefore, the government, by default, at least 
should have the right to impose that liability. This Article also explores 
private-action precedents that would incentivize citizens to sue to remedy 
public harm. 
Finally, this Article analyzes less direct ways to impose personal liability in 
order to deter excessive systemic risk-taking. For example, by protecting a 
firm’s shareholders from the firm’s liabilities (except to the extent of invested 
capital), corporate limited liability fosters moral hazard, leading to excessive 
corporate risk-taking. In the past, corporate limited liability was justified 
because (by addressing shareholder risk aversion) it encourages equity-capital 
investment, and its potential for harm was thought to be limited to the firm’s 
investors. 
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The externalized systemic harm associated with the rise of shadow 
banking244 shifts that balance radically, however. Because shadow-banking 
firms are often managed directly by their primary shareholders, who are 
entitled to a significant share of their firm’s profits but are protected under 
limited liability from losing more than their invested capital if the risk turns out 
poorly, those shareholder-managers have strong incentives to take high risks 
that could generate outsized profits. Moreover, the failure of a shadow-banking 
firm is likely to have systemic consequences: shadow banks not only engage in 
financial intermediation on which the real economy is dependent but also are 
highly interconnected with traditional banks. To help reduce these systemically 
risk-taking incentives, this Article proposes narrowing the limited liability 
protection245 of shareholder-managers who have the power to control their 
shadow-banking firms. 
 
 244 Recall that shadow banking refers to the decentralized provision of financing outside of traditional 
banking channels. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 245 This Article suggests narrowing that limited liability to double liability or some other multiple of the 
investment. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
